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DEPOLITICIZING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY 
RULEMAKING 
Scott A. Keller* 
Abstract: Administrative law doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking, such as the 
Supreme Court’s dicta in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.1 and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine, give judges significant 
discretion to invalidate agency rules. Many commentators recognize that this discretion 
politicizes judicial review of agency rulemaking, as judges appointed by a president of one 
political party are more likely to invalidate agency rules promulgated under the presidential 
administration of a different political party. Unelected judges, though, should not be able to 
use indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on the basis that 
they disagree with the policy decisions of a presidential administration.  
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc.2 implicitly eliminated State Farm’s dicta and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look 
doctrine. In place of these paternalistic doctrines, courts should establish a doctrine for 
reviewing agency rulemaking that examines only the agency’s purpose in regulating and the 
means used by the agency to achieve that purpose—instead of giving courts leeway to 
impose additional procedures on agencies and to nitpick rulemaking records. Constitutional 
doctrines for reviewing legislation already focus on a government actor’s purpose and means, 
so these doctrines should also be used for reviewing agency rules, which are legislative-like 
pronouncements that are binding with the force of law.  
Ultimately, this Article proposes that courts should review agency rulemaking under the 
standard for reviewing legislation known as “rational basis with bite.” Rational basis with 
bite would require the agency, at the time it promulgates a rule, to articulate its actual 
statutory purpose in promulgating the rule and explain how the rule is rationally related to 
that purpose. Not only would rational basis with bite significantly limit the ability of judges 
to invalidate agency rules based on policy disagreements, but the standard fits well with the 
Supreme Court’s precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review. 
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1. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Obama Administration’s largest impact on federal policy may 
very well come from institutions that are not usually on the public’s 
radar screen: administrative agencies. Federal agencies create a 
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substantial majority of the country’s new laws,3 and “[t]here is going to 
be a huge amount of action in the regulatory arena after years of 
deregulation under President Bush.”4 Weeks into office, President 
Obama directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
reconsider two Bush Administration decisions: (1) preventing states 
from setting auto emission and fuel efficiency standards that are more 
stringent than federal standards,5 and (2) adopting less stringent controls 
on mercury pollution from power plants.6 Similarly, as soon as President 
Obama took office, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 
“the world’s first test in people of a therapy derived from human 
embryonic stem cells”—a clinical trial that had been rejected by the 
Bush Administration.7 Moreover, the Obama Administration’s Interior 
Department reversed the Bush Administration’s plan to allow offshore 
oil drilling.8 Some also believe that the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) under the Obama Administration could reinstitute 
the controversial “fairness doctrine.”9  
The Bush Administration anticipated that the Obama Administration 
would overhaul the country’s administrative regulations, so in the final 
months of President Bush’s tenure, his Administration took a series of 
administrative actions to deregulate various consumer and 
                                                     
3. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sheer amount 
of law . . . made by [administrative] agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by 
Congress through the traditional process.”). 
4. Brian C. Mooney, Harvard’s Sunstein to Oversee Regulation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2009, at 
A12 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen). 
5. John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2009, at A1. 
6. Tom Goldstein, EPA Moves to Dismiss Clean Air Act Case, Reversing Bush Administration 
Policies, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/epa-moves-to-dismiss-
clean-air-act-case-reversing-bush-administration-policies/.  
7. Andrew Pollack, Milestone In Research In Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at B1. 
8. Bush-Era Offshore Drilling Plan Is Set Aside, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 10, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.com/id/29119940. 
9. See John Eggerton, Citing Obama Opposition, McDowell Warns Against Fairness Doctrine, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.multichannel.com/article/print/162933-
Citing_Obama_Opposition_McDowell_Warns_Against_Fairness_Doctrine.php; George F. Will, 
Broadcast ‘Fairness’ Fouls Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2008, at B7; see generally Red Lion Broad. 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (“The Federal Communications Commission has for many 
years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that discussion of public issues 
be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage. 
This is known as the fairness doctrine . . . .”). 
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environmental industries.10 Most would assume that the administrative 
actions of an outgoing president could be overturned by an incoming 
presidential administration that wants to reverse course on federal 
regulatory policy. After all, the electorate holds presidents accountable 
for their actions, and presidential administrations react to the public’s 
perception of the administration’s regulatory policies.11  
But administrative law doctrines for judicial review of agency 
rulemaking have become a “judicially created obstacle course”12 that 
gives judges far too much leeway to reach results based on their partisan 
policy preferences.13 This, in turn, allows unelected judges to prevent 
                                                     
10. See R. Jeffrey Smith, A Last Push to Deregulate, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1 (“The 
White House is working to enact a wide array of federal regulations, many of which would weaken 
government rules aimed at protecting consumers and the environment, before President Bush leaves 
office in January.”); see also Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 2162, 2162 (2009) (“And as President Bush’s term came to an end, his staff took steps widely 
viewed as intended to ensure the Obama Administration would have a more difficult time undoing 
Bush’s rules than the Bush Administration had undoing Clinton’s eight years earlier. The pattern is 
familiar, dating to the first hostile presidential transition from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
11. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2337 (2001) (“The 
Presidency is by nature a public institution, and almost no presidential exercise of authority, 
however masked or oblique, long can escape public notice; this scrutiny then will bring to bear on 
the President the pressures associated with a national constituency.”). 
12. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).  
13. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?] (providing 
statistical analyses of judicial voting behavior); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for 
Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1270–74 (1999) (discussing the “evidence of 
judicial ideological decisionmaking” in administrative law); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of 
Appeal, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–69 (1998) (noting that D.C. Circuit panels controlled by judges 
appointed by Republican presidents reached conservative decisions in 54% of cases, and panels 
controlled by Democratic appointees reached liberal decisions in 68% of cases); Thomas J. Miles & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 807 (2008) 
[hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review] (recognizing, under the arbitrary and 
capricious review standard, that “judicial policy preferences do play a significant role, and in the 
difficult cases, it does seem to be driving actual outcomes”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 827 (2006) (“[T]he application of the Chevron framework . . . shows a significant effect from 
the political convictions of federal judges.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative 
Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency 
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300 (1988); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and 
the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Does Red Lion Still 
Roar? Keynote Address, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (2008) (discussing the statistical analyses 
of judicial voting behavior reported in SUNSTEIN, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? and noting that “[t]here 
 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking 
423 
many shifts in regulatory policy favored by an incoming president. 
President Bush therefore could have expected that his final deregulatory 
acts would “be difficult for his successor to undo.”14  
Of course, this is nothing new for modern presidential 
administrations. President Reagan campaigned on a major shift in 
federal regulatory policy,15 but the deregulatory changes his Republican 
administration enacted were met with staunch resistance by the courts—
which were freshly packed with judges appointed by Democratic 
President Carter.16 Indeed, the administrative law doctrines adopted in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s allowed judges to use their policy 
preferences to invalidate agency action.17 These doctrines are still used 
today, and they could prevent the Obama Administration from shifting 
regulatory policy as President Obama has promised.18 Like President 
Reagan, President Obama will have to get his regulatory changes 
through courts that are full of judges who were appointed by his 
predecessor.19 
It would be a mistake, however, for judges to continue using 
indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on 
the basis that they disagree with the policy decisions of a presidential 
administration.20 This argument does not turn on the prudence of the 
                                                     
is a statistically significant difference between the overall liberal voting rate of Democratic and 
Republican appointees”). 
14. Smith, supra note 10, at A1. 
15. See Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard Way to Fight a 
Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 527 (1990) (“Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, had been 
campaigning for years against big government and bureaucratic excess and entered office pledged to 
strong, swift action against ‘overregulation.’” (quoting MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE 
POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 29–30 (Brookings Institution, 1985))). 
16. See, e.g., Michael D. Schattman, Picking Federal Judges: A Mysterious Alchemy, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1578, 1593 (1998) (noting that during President Carter’s tenure, Congress created 117 new 
federal trial judges and 35 new federal appellate judges). 
17. See supra note 13. 
18. See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text. 
19. See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial 
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 866 (2008) (“[F]or 
judges with lifetime tenure, at any given time their policy preferences may well lag behind those of 
the public and of existing parties.”). 
20. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. 
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the 
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
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Obama Administration’s policies; rather, it is driven by the 
Constitution’s requirement for the separation of powers and the need to 
respect institutional competence. The courts can just as easily invalidate 
the agency rulemaking of a Democratic President as a Republican 
President. For example, even in President Bush’s final year of office, 
courts struck down his administration’s regulations related to global 
warming and to the broadcast of indecent material.21 Quite simply, 
administrative law doctrines need to be modified to prevent unelected 
judges from using their policy preferences to invalidate agency 
rulemaking.  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc.22 may be the watershed precedent that charts a new course 
for administrative law. The doctrinal culprits that have allowed judges to 
use their policy preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking are the 
Supreme Court’s dicta on the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.23 
and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. While Fox Television did not 
explicitly reject the State Farm dicta and the hard look doctrine, the way 
Fox Television engaged in APA arbitrary and capricious review 
implicitly rejected both.  
Consequently, after Fox Television, courts should replace State 
Farm’s dicta and the hard look doctrine with a doctrine for reviewing 
agency rulemaking that examines the agency’s purpose in regulating and 
the means used by the agency to achieve that purpose—instead of 
requiring the agency to use additional procedures and scouring the 
rulemaking record to make up insignificant problems with that record. 
Constitutional doctrines for reviewing legislation already focus on the 
purpose and means of a governmental actor.24 By tying review of agency 
rulemaking to the doctrines for reviewing legislation, courts could 
provide a limiting principle to justify their review of agency rulemaking. 
                                                     
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”). 
21. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2008) (striking 
down Bush Administration fuel emissions standards on the basis of global warming); CBS Corp. v. 
FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 171 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (invalidating the Bush 
Administration’s rule that penalized the broadcast of indecent material). 
22. 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
23. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
24. See infra notes 223–232 and accompanying text. 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking 
425 
This limiting principle would also recognize that precedents on 
reviewing legislation from the past century have used trial and error to 
find the most effective doctrines for reviewing legislative-like 
pronouncements, such as agency rules. Moreover, this shift would 
coincide with the modern Court’s insistence that the APA be interpreted 
as it was understood when Congress enacted it in 1946.25  
Ultimately, this Article proposes that courts should review agency 
rulemaking under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A), according to the standard for reviewing legislation that has 
become known as “rational basis with bite.”26 This is the standard that 
emerges from Fox Television.27 Rational basis with bite would require 
the agency, at the time it promulgates a rule, to articulate its actual 
statutory purpose in promulgating the rule and explain how the rule is 
rationally related to that purpose.28 This should not be a heavy burden on 
agencies as the APA already requires them to provide a “concise general 
statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.”29 Courts therefore would 
not be permitted to come up with hypothetical purposes or explanations 
to justify the agency’s rule, as courts are allowed to do under traditional 
rational basis review (known also as “minimum rationality review”). Not 
only would rational basis with bite significantly reduce the ability of 
judges to veto agency rules based on policy disagreements, but the 
Supreme Court’s precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review fit 
quite well with the rational basis with bite doctrine.  
Rational basis with bite is also preferable to the other standards used 
in reviewing legislation. To eliminate the chances of judges using their 
policy preferences in reviewing agency rulemaking, some might be 
tempted to adopt minimum rationality review, the traditional rational 
                                                     
25. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.  
26. This Article focuses on agency informal (notice-and-comment) rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 
553 (2006). The APA’s arbitrary and capricious review standard applies when courts review agency 
informal rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The arbitrary and capricious standard, though, also 
applies when courts review other forms of agency action, such as informal adjudication. See, e.g., 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). It could be prudent for 
courts to use the same rational basis with bite standard in reviewing those other forms of agency 
action under APA arbitrary and capricious review. This Article, however, does not address this issue 
because part of the rationale for proposing the rational basis with bite standard is the connection 
between agency rulemaking and legislation. See infra Part I.A.  
27. See infra notes 201–203, 296–297 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 67–71, 235–238 and accompanying text. 
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:419, 2009 
426 
basis test for reviewing most legislation—which is extremely 
deferential.30 However, there are strong reasons for using a heightened 
standard for review of agency rulemaking as compared to review of 
legislation: Agencies are comprised of unelected officials and are not 
required to use the rigorous procedures that the Constitution requires of 
Congress, and the Supreme Court underenforces the nondelegation 
doctrine.31 At the same time, intermediate or strict scrutiny would only 
make it easier for judges to use their policy preferences to invalidate 
agency rules, because those doctrines give judges much more latitude to 
do so than does rational basis with bite.32 Rational basis with bite 
drastically reduces the ability of judges to infuse their policy preferences 
into review of agency rulemaking, but still subjects agency rules to a 
heightened standard of review compared to review of most legislation.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the Supreme Court’s 
evolving doctrine for reviewing agency rulemaking by comparing how 
the Court’s changing doctrine for reviewing agency rulemaking differs 
from the Court’s doctrines for reviewing legislation. In hindsight, this 
may seem like an obvious way to evaluate the doctrine for reviewing 
agency rulemaking, but no court or commentator has written of the link 
between these doctrines. Part I thus also shows how judges got into the 
business of invalidating agency rules on the basis of policy 
disagreements in the first place, and it explains how the Supreme Court 
left lower courts with little guidance on how to review agency 
rulemaking until Fox Television was recently decided. This allowed the 
D.C. Circuit—the federal court that reviews most agency rulemaking—
to invalidate a significant number of agency rules under its hard look 
doctrine.  
Part II argues that doctrines for judicial review of legislation should 
be used in creating doctrines for judicial review of agency rulemaking, 
because this will shift the focus back to reviewing an agency’s purpose 
in regulating and the means used to further that purpose. Unelected 
judges have been overruling the substantive policy decisions made by 
expert agencies because courts in the 1970s and 1980s began divorcing 
doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking from doctrines for reviewing 
legislation. Without any theoretical limitations on judicial review of 
                                                     
30. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 52–67 and accompanying text.  
32. See infra notes 279–280 and accompanying text. 
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agency rulemaking, arbitrary and capricious review under the APA 
before Fox Television had essentially become a mechanism for courts to 
veto agency rulemaking.  
Part III then proposes that the rational basis with bite doctrine be used 
for APA arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking. This Part 
concludes by applying rational basis with bite review to two recent court 
of appeals cases to show how the doctrine fits with existing Supreme 
Court precedent and can prevent judges from using their policy 
preferences to uphold or invalidate agency rulemaking. 
The arguments in Parts II and III are conceptually distinct: One could 
accept that doctrines for reviewing legislation should be used in creating 
doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking (agreeing with Part II), while 
arguing that a level of scrutiny other than rational basis with bite should 
be used in reviewing agency rulemaking (disagreeing with Part III). This 
distinction is important because neither courts nor commentators have 
suggested that the doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking should be 
based on the doctrines for reviewing legislation. Thus, even if there is 
disagreement over this Article’s ultimate proposal that the rational basis 
with bite doctrine should be used in reviewing agency rulemaking, the 
decades-long debate regarding the justifications and doctrines for 
judicial review of agency rulemaking would be greatly clarified by 
tethering the doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking to the doctrines 
for reviewing legislation. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING DOCTRINE FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING 
The courts have gone through various phases in reviewing agency 
rulemaking. Most accounts of these phases focus on the different 
degrees of faith that judges have had in administrative agencies, without 
examining the underlying doctrinal shifts.33 This Part makes that 
                                                     
33. The typical account of the changes in deference to agencies goes something like this: Courts 
gave broad deference to agencies immediately after President Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1930s; 
courts retracted the deference accorded to agencies by the 1970s when courts became skeptical that 
agencies had been captured by the regulated industries; and, while that 1970s view largely holds 
true today, some modern courts have re-expanded the deference to agencies based on a textualist 
view that the APA should be interpreted as it was understood when it was enacted in 1946. See 
generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 
1191–94, 1207, 1224, 1252–53, 1264–67, 1286–95, 1308–09, 1315–18, 1325–26 (1986), as 
reprinted in PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13–23 (10th 
ed. 2003). 
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examination by comparing the Supreme Court’s evolving doctrines for 
judicial review of agency rulemaking with its doctrines for judicial 
review of legislation. This novel analysis provides a more complete 
picture of why courts began according agency rulemaking less deference 
and how judicial review of agency rulemaking has become so 
politicized. 
As the rest of Part I will show, the Supreme Court at first treated 
agency rulemaking exactly the same as it treated legislation. Soon, 
though, the Court recognized the differences between agency rules and 
legislation, and started subjecting agency rulemaking to a slightly higher 
standard of review. By the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit became extremely 
wary that administrative agencies had been captured by the industries 
they regulated. It therefore created the hard look doctrine, which gave 
courts the power to invalidate agency rulemaking for a whole host of 
reasons—for example, because the agency did not afford interested 
parties enough procedure or the agency did not sufficiently analyze 
alternatives. The Supreme Court’s reaction to the D.C. Circuit’s hard 
look doctrine was anything but a model of clarity, and it left the doctrine 
for reviewing agency rulemaking in shambles. Indeed, administrative 
law textbooks today still ponder how the Court’s three major arbitrary 
and capricious review cases—Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,34 Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,35 
and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.36—
                                                     
34. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 505, 529 (1985) (explaining that Vermont Yankee was limited to rejecting procedural hard 
look); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 356 (1978) (noting that Vermont Yankee was decided on the basis of 
“inadequacy of procedures” and not “inadequacy of record support”); Matthew Warren, Note, 
Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. 
Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 2631 (2002) (stating that Vermont Yankee rejected procedural hard 
look). 
35. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). See, e.g., Garland, supra note 34, at 543 (“On one level, the State Farm 
decision is a ringing endorsement of the quasi-procedural hard look.”); id. at 545 (recognizing that 
both elements of the substantive hard look—scrutiny of the agency’s record and a heightened 
standard of review going beyond minimum rationality—appeared in State Farm); Kagan, supra note 
11, at 2372 (explaining that courts regularly review “agencies’ decisionmaking processes under the 
‘hard look’ standard exemplified in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.”); Warren, supra note 34, 2631 (“[T]he Supreme Court 
finally used the substantive hard look standard to overturn an agency action in [State Farm].”). 
36. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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fit together, and those cases were all decided at least twenty-five years 
ago.37 However, the Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. significantly limits the ability of judges to invalidate 
agency action. This Article argues that Fox Television implicitly rejected 
the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine and eliminated the criteria for 
overturning agency action listed in dicta in State Farm.  
A. Equating Agency Rulemaking with Legislation 
Because the Supreme Court has essentially abandoned the 
nondelegation doctrine, agencies are permitted to make rules that 
generally function as if they were statutes enacted by Congress itself. 
According to the nondelegation doctrine, “Congress may not 
constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of 
Government.”38 The Court, however, has interpreted the nondelegation 
doctrine such that it virtually never prevents Congress from delegating 
legislative power to agencies.39 Consequently, Congress can delegate 
“authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of 
law,”40 and agency rules that are binding with the force of law basically 
function as congressional legislation. So when an agency promulgates a 
rule that is binding with the force of law (for example, through informal 
rulemaking—which is also known as notice-and-comment rulemaking), 
it is acting as a proxy for Congress in the lawmaking process.41 
It would therefore make sense to develop doctrines for judicial review 
of agency rulemaking with regard to the doctrines developed for judicial 
review of legislation, as both deal with review of legislative-like 
                                                     
37. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 33, at 989 (leaving open the question of “[w]hat analytical 
pattern” Overton Park, State Farm, and Chevron “exhibit”). 
38. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 
143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a 
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of 
government ordained by the Constitution.”). 
39. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (noting that the 
nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to provide agencies with an intelligible principle, and that 
such intelligible principles require very little specificity). 
40. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
41. See id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action 
with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to 
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. . . . Thus, 
the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”).  
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pronouncements that carry the force of law. In fact, when Congress 
codified the arbitrary and capricious standard for reviewing agency 
action in the APA in 1946,42 it was actually adopting the “rational basis” 
standard used by the Supreme Court to review most pieces of 
congressional legislation.43 Under rational basis review, the Court asks 
(1) whether the law at issue furthers a legitimate governmental purpose, 
and (2) whether the law is rationally related to that purpose.44 As applied 
to agencies, this rational basis test would ask whether the agency acted 
in accordance with a legitimate statutory purpose—not just any 
governmental purpose—as agencies’ powers are limited by the statutory 
delegations made by Congress.  
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White45 provides the most 
frequently cited pre-APA example of equating arbitrary and capricious 
review to rational basis review. The Court stated: 
With the wisdom of such a regulation we have, of course, no 
concern. We may enquire only whether it is arbitrary or 
capricious. That the requirement is not arbitrary or capricious 
seems clear. That the type of container prescribed by Oregon is 
an appropriate means for attaining permissible ends cannot be 
doubted.46 
                                                     
42. The phrase “arbitrary or capricious” appears in the U.S. Reports 141 times before 1946: A 
Westlaw search on July 8, 2009, of “arbitrar! /3 capricious! & da(bef 1946)” in the Supreme Court 
opinion database retrieved 141 documents. Congress therefore was not trying to reinvent the wheel 
by using the phrase “arbitrary or capricious,” but was rather adopting a standard for judicial review 
of agency actions that the Supreme Court had been using in other contexts for years.  
43. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129–30 (1942) (“An Act of Congress is not to be 
refused application by the courts as arbitrary and capricious and forbidden by the Due Process 
Clause merely because it is deemed in a particular case to work an inequitable result.”); Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (“[T]he guaranty of due process, as has often been held, 
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious . . . .”); Dent v. West 
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (“[D]ue process of law . . . exclude[s] everything that is arbitrary and 
capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizen.”). See also Jack M. Beermann & Gary 
Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 870 (2007) (“[T]he passage 
in § 706(2)(A) instructing courts to hold unlawful any agency action that is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ was probably intended in 1946 to 
reflect something like the ‘rational basis’ test in post-1937 substantive due process law.” (citations 
omitted)); Cross, supra note 13, at 1246 n.7 (“The original understanding of [arbitrary or capricious] 
was that courts would reverse rules only when an agency ‘acted like a lunatic.’” (quoting Martin 
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 454 (1986))). 
44. See infra notes 229–232 and accompanying text. 
45. 296 U.S. 176 (1935). 
46. Id. at 182 (emphases added). 
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Pacific States Box even “expressly equated agencies with legislatures 
for purposes of judicial review.”47 So when Congress used the phrase 
“arbitrary or capricious” in the APA, it intended for courts to focus on 
the agency’s purpose in regulating and the means used to achieve that 
purpose, by applying the deferential rational basis standard used for 
evaluating most congressional acts.48 Such a conclusion also coincides 
with the historical context because the post-New Deal Congress was 
weary of courts striking down portions of the regulatory state,49 as the 
Supreme Court had done during the Lochner v. New York50 era that had 
lasted until 1937.51  
B. Recognizing the Differences Between Agency Rulemaking and 
Legislation 
Of course, there are substantial reasons for subjecting agency action 
to heightened standards of judicial review compared to legislation. An 
agency promulgating rules is hardly the equivalent of Congress 
legislating. Members of Congress are elected and are therefore 
accountable to their constituents, while agencies are comprised of 
appointed officials and civil servants who are not directly accountable to 
                                                     
47. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 532 (1985); 
see id. at 532 n.146 (quoting Pacific States Box, 296 U.S. at 186 (“[W]here the regulation is within 
the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of the existence of facts justifying its 
specific exercise attaches to statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administrative 
bodies.”)).  
48. As then-Professor Scalia pointed out, however, Congress probably expected the arbitrary or 
capricious standard of review for informal rulemaking to apply to a much smaller set of cases than it 
currently applies to. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and The 
Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 375–78. That is because Congress could not have 
predicted that, after the APA was enacted, the Court would greatly expand the circumstances when 
agencies could use informal rulemaking instead of adjudication. Id. at 375–77. Nor could Congress 
have predicted that the Court would establish “the principle that rules could be challenged in court 
directly rather than merely in the context of an adjudicatory enforcement proceeding against a 
particular individual.” Id. at 377. 
49. See generally Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of 
the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 2601 (2002) (“During the New Deal 
era, the specter of Lochner v. New York and the fear of judicial invalidation of the regulatory state 
loomed largely over administrative law.” (citation omitted)). 
50. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York law that limited the working hours for bakers). 
51. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding, under the 
Commerce Clause, Congress’s power to regulate labor relations); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington’s minimum wage law and rejecting a Lochner-based, 
substantive due process freedom of contract rationale). 
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the citizens of the United States.52 Moreover, when Congress legislates, 
it must follow a “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure”:53 Presentment of congressional acts to the President could 
result in a presidential veto, and the bicameral structure of Congress 
requires “full study and debate in separate settings.”54 In contrast, 
agencies can promulgate rules using the minimal set of informal 
procedures listed in APA section 553: The agency must simply provide a 
“[g]eneral notice of proposed rulemaking,” an opportunity for interested 
persons to comment on the proposed rule through written submissions to 
the agency, a “concise general statement” of the final rule’s “basis and 
purpose,” and “publication” of the final rule.55 Undoubtedly, one of the 
greatest advantages of agencies is their ability to quickly and efficiently 
engage in informal rulemaking,56 but this also significantly undermines 
the basis for treating agency rulemaking as the equivalent of legislation.  
Heightened standards for reviewing agency rulemaking can also be 
justified on the premise that there is not as much at stake in invalidating 
an agency’s rule compared to striking down congressional legislation. 
Congress can always amend its delegation to allow the agency to 
promulgate the rule at issue (or Congress can just pass the rule through 
legislation), so the “costs” of incorrectly applying heightened standards 
are “drastically reduced when the consequence is simply to ‘remand’ the 
question back to Congress instead of categorically prohibiting Congress 
or agencies from acting.”57 
On a more fundamental level, though, seeing the nondelegation 
doctrine as an underenforced constitutional norm58 could provide a 
                                                     
52. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice 
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 517 (1988) (“[L]egislators 
who want to avoid controversial or indeterminate decisions as to which interest groups to favor can 
forfeit vast amounts of discretion (and thus responsibility and accountability) to administrative 
agencies, which function outside of the tripartite legislative process envisioned by our constitutional 
structure.”). 
53. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
54. Id. 
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
56. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15 (1970) (describing APA 
informal rulemaking as being among the “greatest inventions of modern government”). 
57. Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative 
Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 88 (2008) (quoting Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s 
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 91 (2004)). 
58. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the 
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our 
 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking 
433 
constitutional basis for requiring heightened judicial review of agency 
rulemaking compared to legislation.59 The Court rejects the 
nondelegation doctrine largely because it wants to give Congress 
adequate power to deal with an ever-increasing workload60 and because 
it is unable to create a manageable nondelegation doctrine test—not 
because the Court believes there are no problems with allowing 
Congress to delegate legislative power to agencies.61 In light of these 
“questions of propriety or capacity” relating to the Court’s abilities, the 
Court has created a “judicial concept of [the] constitutional concept 
[embodied by the nondelegation doctrine]” that is different from the 
“[constitutional] concept itself.”62  
But this does not mean that the “understanding of [the nondelegation 
                                                     
constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2000) (“The difficulty of drawing lines 
between prohibited and permitted delegations makes it reasonable to conclude that for the most part, 
the ban on unacceptable delegations is a judicially underenforced norm, and properly so.”). See 
generally Keller, supra note 57, at 57–59 (discussing how the nondelegation doctrine is an 
underenforced constitutional norm). 
59. See Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 13, at 762 (“[T]he hard look doctrine 
might be seen as a second-best substitute for the original constitutional safeguards against the 
uncontrolled exercise of discretion.”); Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control Over 
the “Hard-Look,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1134–39 (2004) (suggesting that a congressional 
amendment to the APA that restored Pacific States Box’s minimum rationality approach to judicial 
review of agency action may be unconstitutional); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, 
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate 
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 425 (arguing that “separation of powers 
principles” require “heightened scrutiny of agency decisions”). 
60. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 
(2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Federal Government 
could not perform its duties in a responsible and effective way without administrative agencies.”); 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407–08 (1928) (permitting Congress to 
delegate legislative power on the grounds that “common sense” allows Congress to delegate what it 
cannot practicably do itself). 
61. See Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (“There is no reason to magnify the 
separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch by letting Article III judges—
like jackals stealing the lion’s kill—expropriate some of the power that Congress has wrested from 
the unitary Executive.” (citation omitted)); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard 
of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1374 (2001) (explaining that the Court’s reluctance to enforce 
the nondelegation doctrine “appears to stem from the judiciary’s limited institutional competence 
rather than any fundamental disagreement with the doctrine’s goal.”); Murphy, supra note 59, at 
1134 (stating that the courts could not “devise a stable, workable, desirable form of the 
nondelegation doctrine”).  
62. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217–18 (1978). 
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doctrine] itself”63 cannot be enforced through other means, such as 
applying heightened standards of judicial review of agency rulemaking 
compared to legislation.64 In other words, if the Court had enforced the 
constitutional concept of the nondelegation doctrine—that Congress 
cannot delegate legislative power—agencies would never have been 
permitted to exercise legislative power by promulgating rules carrying 
the force of law.65 Due to the limits on the institutional competence of 
courts, though, the Court has not enforced that constitutional concept 
and has instead created the judicial concept of the nondelegation 
doctrine: the intelligible principle test, which simply requires Congress 
to provide some intelligible principle in the statutory delegation to cabin 
the agency’s authority.66 Nevertheless, the Court could still impose 
heightened standards of judicial review of agency rulemaking “as a 
second-best surrogate” for the substantive enforcement of the 
nondelegation doctrine.67 
Given the inherent difference between agencies and Congress plus the 
underenforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, it is no surprise that the 
Supreme Court quickly began treating agency rulemaking differently 
from congressional legislation. Just one year after the APA was enacted, 
SEC v. Chenery68 reaffirmed a pre-APA ruling that a court should only 
examine the actual purposes “invoked by the agency” instead of 
“substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.”69 
                                                     
63. Id. at 1218. 
64. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 126 (2004) 
(“[A]s Larry Sager has demonstrated, the fact that a norm is ‘under-enforced’—that is, enforced 
through something short of a strong invalidation norm—does not mean the norm lacks grounding in 
the Constitution.”); id. at 101 (arguing that courts should be permitted “to impose some restraint in 
areas where constitutional norms would otherwise be ‘underenforced.’”). 
65. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“This Court’s decisions 
sanctioning such [administrative] delegations make clear that Art. I does not require all action with 
the effect of legislation to be passed as law.”). 
66. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (noting that the 
nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to provide agencies with an intelligible principle, and that 
such intelligible principles require very little specificity). For further discussion regarding the 
dichotomy between constitutional concepts and judicial concepts, see Mitchell N. Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 51–60 (2004). 
67. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2112 
(1990). 
68. SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
69. Id. at 196. Four years earlier, when SEC v. Chenery was before the Supreme Court for the 
first time, the Court required the agency “to give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion 
with which Congress has empowered it.” SEC v. Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943). 
 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking 
435 
This marked a split from how the Court reviewed congressional action: 
In 1946 (and through at least 1980), it was unclear whether rational basis 
review allowed courts to consider any hypothetical, conceivable purpose 
that Congress may have had in enacting a law, or only Congress’s actual 
purpose.70 The former approach (consideration of any hypothetical, 
conceivable purpose) is usually called “minimum rationality”; the latter 
approach (consideration of actual purpose only) has become known as 
“rational basis with bite.”71 Recently, the Supreme Court has clarified 
that rational basis review of congressional acts entails the former 
approach, such that courts can examine hypothetical, conceivable 
purposes when reviewing congressional action.72 But since Chenery, the 
Court has implicitly used the rational basis with bite approach in 
reviewing agency action.  
Of course, this observation about Chenery is made much easier in 
hindsight: There is no indication that the Court thought about how 
Chenery affected the rational basis test previously adopted in Pacific 
States Box, and to this day the Court has not formally recognized the 
rational basis with bite doctrine even in the context of judicial review of 
legislation. To compound the ambiguity, Chenery never even cited the 
APA or the arbitrary and capricious standard. The Chenery Court did not 
view its decision as a groundbreaking precedent: It thought it was 
reciting “[a] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law,” and it 
                                                     
Chenery I therefore held “that an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon 
which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.” 
Id. at 95. (Note that this Article primarily refers to Chenery I and Chenery II simply as “Chenery,” 
as both cases stand for the same proposition. Throughout, the cases are distinguished only as needed 
for clarity.). 
70. Compare, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“It is, of course, 
‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,’ because 
this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.” 
(citation omitted)), with id. at 180–81 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I therefore believe 
that we must discover a correlation between the classification and either the actual purpose of the 
statute or a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial 
legislature.”), and id. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A challenged classification may be sustained 
only if it is rationally related to achievement of an actual legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
71. See infra note 235. 
72. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (stating that courts 
could consider any “conceivable” purpose under rational basis review, and “because we never 
require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for 
constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually 
motivated the legislature”). 
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merely adopted one variant of the rational basis test over another.73 But 
Chenery is the first sign that the Supreme Court would treat judicial 
review of agency action differently than judicial review of congressional 
action.  
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,74 the first Supreme Court 
case to invoke the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard explicitly in 
striking down an agency action, introduced a standard for judicial review 
of agency action that looked nothing like the minimum rationality 
review typically used for reviewing legislation.75 While Overton Park 
dealt with an informal adjudication as opposed to the rulemaking that 
Chenery addressed, it still should have been an easy case under Chenery 
because Chenery implicitly embraced a more heightened standard than 
minimum rationality.76 In particular, the analysis in Overton Park should 
have been simple given the facts of the case: the Secretary of 
Transportation had authorized the use of federal funds for building 
Interstate 40 through Overton Park (a 342-acre city park near the center 
of Memphis, Tennessee) without providing an explanation for this 
authorization.77 According to the statutory delegation, though, the 
Secretary could only have authorized these funds if no “feasible and 
prudent” alternative route existed and there had been “all possible 
planning to minimize harm” to the park.78 Because the Secretary “did 
not indicate why he believed there were no feasible and prudent 
alternative routes or why design changes could not be made to reduce 
the harm to the park,”79 the Court could have just cited Chenery and 
remanded for the agency to provide an explanation.  
Instead, Overton Park contains six pages that infused all sorts of 
ambiguity into the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. On one 
hand, Overton Park cited Pacific States Box for the proposition that an 
agency’s “decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity,”80 and it 
described arbitrary and capricious review as a “narrow” standard 
                                                     
73. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196. 
74. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
75. Id. 
76. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196. 
77. 401 U.S. at 408. 
78. Id. at 405 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 ed., Supp. V)); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 ed., 
Supp. V)). 
79. Id. at 408. 
80. Id. at 415 (citing Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935)). 
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through which “[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency.”81 But then the Court erratically described 
arbitrary and capricious review as “thorough, probing, in-depth 
review,”82 which was supposed to be “searching and careful.”83 So while 
Overton Park paid lip service to Pacific States Box’s rational basis 
approach, Overton Park ultimately explained that arbitrary and 
capricious review required courts to “consider whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has 
been a clear error of judgment.”84 It also directed courts to examine the 
agency’s “construction of the evidence” if the agency did “not disclose 
the factors that were considered.”85  
Given that the statutory delegation at issue required the Secretary to 
address alternatives and plan to minimize the harm to parks, Overton 
Park’s requirement that the agency consider all “the relevant factors” 
probably only meant that the agency had to explain how these statutory 
predicates for exercising its delegated authority were met. That is 
precisely what Chenery had already held. However, lower courts—in 
particular the D.C. Circuit—would read Overton Park much more 
broadly. 
C. Analyzing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking Without 
Reference to Doctrines for Judicial Review of Legislation 
The solid basis for subjecting agency rulemaking to heightened 
standards of judicial review compared to legislation does not necessarily 
mean that doctrines for review of agency rulemaking should completely 
ignore the doctrines for review of legislation. Similar modes of analysis 
could be used for both, and the precedent on judicial review of 
legislation could support courts’ interpretation of arbitrary and 
capricious review—even if courts want to impose a heightened standard 
of review for agency rulemaking.  
It would have made sense for courts to place the APA’s arbitrary and 
capricious standard somewhere on the tiers-of-scrutiny sliding scale used 
for judicial review of legislation. Unfortunately, instead of linking 
                                                     
81. Id. at 416. 
82. Id. at 415. 
83. Id. at 416. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 420. 
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judicial review of agency rulemaking to judicial review of legislation, 
courts began concocting an ever-growing list of ways to invalidate 
agency action under APA arbitrary and capricious review. It started with 
the D.C. Circuit creating the “hard look” doctrine in the 1970s under the 
guise of arbitrary and capricious review, and continued because the 
Supreme Court’s reaction to the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine 
provided little guidance to lower courts. This resulted in an unclear, 
arbitrary doctrine for judicial review of agency action with no link to the 
doctrines for judicial review of legislation. The Court’s recent decision 
in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., though, may have changed all of 
this. 
1. The D.C. Circuit Replaced “Arbitrary and Capricious” with 
“Hard Look” 
By 1971, when Overton Park was decided, many believed that 
agencies were no longer “acting in the public interest” because they “had 
been captured by the industries and private interests that they 
regulated.”86 Against this backdrop, the D.C. Circuit—the court that 
reviews most federal agency actions87—became skeptical of agency 
action, and it used Overton Park as an opening to implement the “hard 
look” doctrine under arbitrary and capricious review.88  
Originally, the hard look doctrine required courts to ensure that the 
agency had taken a hard look at the regulatory issues.89 Over time, 
however, the D.C. Circuit morphed the hard look doctrine “into one that 
required a hard look not just by the agency, but by the court as well.”90 
As now-D.C. Circuit Judge Garland recognized, the D.C. Circuit 
developed three iterations of its hard look doctrine: procedural, quasi-
procedural, and substantive hard look.91 Regardless of who was required 
to do the hard looking, in each of these three iterations, the D.C. 
                                                     
86. Warren, supra note 49, at 2602 (citing Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1681–88 (1975)).  
87. See Scalia, supra note 48, at 348 (explaining that the D.C. Circuit “handles the vast majority 
of significant rulemaking appeals”). 
88. The phrase “hard look” was first coined in the administrative law context by Judge Harold 
Leventhal. See Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J.). 
89. See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[A]s originally 
articulated the words ‘hard look’ described the agency’s responsibility and not the courts’.”). 
90. Garland, supra note 47, at 526 (citing Nat’l Lime Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 451–52 n.126).  
91. Id. at 525, 530, 534.  
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Circuit’s hard look doctrine gave courts much more authority to 
invalidate agency action than the rational basis review originally 
contemplated by the APA—and no variant of the hard look doctrine was 
linked to the doctrines for judicial review of congressional action.92  
Procedural hard look, the original version of the hard look doctrine, 
ensured that the “agency itself had taken a hard look at the relevant 
issues before reaching its decision,” by requiring the agency to use 
various procedures—not otherwise required by statute—that expanded 
the ability of interested parties to present their arguments to the 
agency.93 For instance, using procedural hard look, the D.C. Circuit 
required “adjudicatory-type hearing procedures” such as cross-
examination and oral hearings for informal rulemaking,94 even though 
APA section 55395 enumerates which procedures are required for 
informal rulemaking and says nothing about cross-examination and oral 
hearings.96 D.C. Circuit Judge David Bazelon championed procedural 
hard look as “the best way for courts to guard against unreasonable or 
erroneous administrative decisions,” instead of “scrutiniz[ing] the 
technical merits of each decision.”97  
Quasi-procedural hard look required the agency to adopt various 
procedures with which the agency itself had to comply in reaching its 
substantive decision.98 These requirements therefore had a “procedural 
tinge” and yet a “substantive aspect.”99 In other words, quasi-procedural 
                                                     
92. Credit has been given to the D.C. Circuit as a whole for adopting the hard look doctrine under 
the guise of arbitrary and capricious review. See Scalia, supra note 48, at 348 n.13 (suggesting that 
the hard look doctrine had, “on one occasion or another, received the explicit support of most of the 
[D.C. Circuit’s] members”). However, specific judges, such as Judges Harold Leventhal and David 
Bazelon, are widely recognized as having the greatest influence on the development of the hard look 
doctrine. See Warren, supra note 49, at 2607–26 (discussing the different approaches to the hard 
look doctrine espoused by Judges Leventhal and Bazelon).  
93. See Garland, supra note 47, at 525.  
94. Scalia, supra note 48, at 348; accord Garland, supra note 47, at 529 & n.123 (citing Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1259, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Int’l Harvester 
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).  
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (requiring informal rulemaking to include a “[g]eneral notice of 
proposed rulemaking,” an opportunity for “interested persons” to comment on the proposed rule 
through written submissions to the agency, a “concise general statement” of the final rule’s “basis 
and purpose,” and “publication” of the final rule). 
96. Garland, supra note 47, at 529 & n.123. 
97. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
98. Garland, supra note 47, at 530. 
99. Id. 
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hard look “requir[ed] specification of the agency’s policy premises, its 
reasoning, and its factual support.”100 These requirements went to the 
“internal thought process by which an agency decisionmaker reaches a 
rational decision”—as opposed to procedural hard look, whose 
requirements went to the “the external process by which litigants present 
their arguments to the agency.”101 Yet, quasi-procedural hard look did 
not directly address the agency’s substantive policy choice. Rather, 
quasi-procedural hard look required agencies to “respond[] to significant 
points made during the public comment period,” consider “significant 
alternatives,” and examine “all relevant factors.”102 
Under substantive hard look, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the agency’s 
ultimate policy conclusions by “infusing greater rigor into the traditional 
‘rational basis’ test,”103 and it began “intensive[ly]” scrutinizing the 
“record support for agencies’ findings of fact.”104 The seeds for 
substantive hard look were sown as early as 1970, when Judge Harold 
Leventhal’s dicta in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC105 referred 
to a “hard look” doctrine that “call[ed] on the court[s] to intervene not 
merely in case of procedural inadequacies” but anytime the agency had 
“not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.”106 Note the 
shifting standard: “arbitrary and capricious” became “hard look,” which 
became “reasoned decision-making.” “[R]easoned decision-making” is a 
                                                     
100. Id. at 526 (citing Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Columbia 
Gas Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 628 F.2d 578, 593 (D.C Cir. 1979)). 
101. Id. at 530 (quasi-procedural hard look sets forth “the kind of decisionmaking record the 
agency must produce to survive judicial review”—not the “kind of procedure that an agency must 
use to generate a record . . .”). 
102. Id. at 527 (citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); William 
H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 
GEO. L.J. 699, 704–08 (1979)); see also Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 244 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Tatel, J., concurring) (“In previous informal rulemaking cases, we ordered 
additional agency disclosures to facilitate meaningful arbitrary and capricious review . . . .”). 
103. Garland, supra note 47, at 534 (citing Recording Indus. Ass’n v. Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
104. Id. at 535 (citing Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d 644, 651–52 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 735 F.2d 1525, 1531–34 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Public 
Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 99, 102–03, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. 
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 734 F.2d 1486, 1515–16, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1984); ILGWU v. Donovan, 
722 F.2d 795, 818–26 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
105. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.). 
106. Id. at 851 (emphasis added). 
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much more open-ended standard of review than the rational basis test 
contemplated by Pacific States Box. This equivocation on the term 
“reasonable” even caused Judge Bazelon to criticize Judge Leventhal’s 
substantive hard look as an inquiry that “inevitably invites judges of 
opposing views to make plausible-sounding, but simplistic, judgments of 
the relative weight to be afforded various pieces of technical data.”107 
Eventually, the Supreme Court joined this debate, which had been 
brewing in the D.C. Circuit for nearly a decade, but the Court’s reaction 
did not bring the debate to an end. 
2. The Supreme Court’s Reaction to the D.C. Circuit’s Hard Look 
Doctrine 
To this day, the Supreme Court has not definitively addressed all 
three iterations of the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.108 The Supreme 
Court clearly rejected procedural hard look in Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.109 While some 
                                                     
107. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
Judge Leventhal responded by arguing that “Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative 
powers broadly and courts have upheld such delegation because there is court review to assure that 
the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives 
within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory.” Id. at 68–69 
(Leventhal, J., concurring). 
108. The Supreme Court has described the extra procedures imposed by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as requiring the agency to take a “‘hard look’ at environmental 
consequences.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (quoting Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)), quoted in Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. __ (Nov. 12, 2008), 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008); Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 
(1989) (“NEPA does require that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental effects of their 
planned action . . . .”), quoted in Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004). 
This “hard look” has no bearing on the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of review, and only 
applies in environmental cases under NEPA. Because a statute other than the APA (i.e., NEPA) is 
imposing additional procedures, this line of cases does not conflict with Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), which held that 
courts could not impose additional procedures on agencies beyond those required by statute. 
Moreover, this hard look under NEPA has nothing to do with substantive review, as “it is now well 
settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary 
process.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.  
109. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See Garland, supra note 47, at 529 (explaining that Vermont Yankee 
was limited to rejecting procedural hard look); Scalia, supra note 48, at 356 (noting that Vermont 
Yankee was decided on the basis of “inadequacy of procedures” and not “inadequacy of record 
support”); Warren, supra note 49, at 2631 (stating that Vermont Yankee rejected Judge Bazelon’s 
procedural hard look). 
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commentators have posited that the Court accepted quasi-procedural and 
substantive hard look in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,110 that is an over-reading of 
State Farm. Rather than adopting any part of the hard look doctrine, 
State Farm merely gave an amorphous list of criteria for invalidating 
agency action—in dicta. And then Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.111 created a large escape hatch from 
State Farm.  
a. Vermont Yankee Rejected Procedural Hard Look 
A unanimous Supreme Court came down hard on the D.C. Circuit in 
Vermont Yankee by rejecting procedural hard look. Vermont Yankee held 
that APA section 553112 “established the maximum procedural 
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose 
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”113 The agency in 
Vermont Yankee had not allowed the interested parties to use discovery 
or cross-examination during the rulemaking proceedings, neither of 
which is required by APA section 553.114 The D.C. Circuit “refrained 
from actually ordering the agency to follow any specific procedures,”115 
and claimed that it did not want to “intrude on the agency’s province by 
dictating to it which, if any, [procedures not required by APA section 
                                                     
110. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). See, e.g., Garland, supra note 47, at 543 (“On one level, the State Farm 
decision is a ringing endorsement of the quasi-procedural hard look.”); id. at 545 (recognizing that 
both elements of the substantive hard look—scrutiny of the agency’s record and a heightened 
standard of review going beyond minimum rationality—appeared in State Farm); Kagan, supra note 
11, at 2372 (explaining that courts regularly review “agencies’ decisionmaking processes under the 
‘hard look’ standard exemplified in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.”); Warren, supra note 49, at 2631 (“[T]he Supreme Court 
finally used the substantive hard look standard to overturn an agency action in [State Farm].”). 
111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
112. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
113. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978).  
114. Scalia, supra note 48, at 353; see Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 541 (noting that the 
intervenors argued that they should have been afforded the opportunity for “discovery or cross-
examination”); id. at 535 (“[D]espite the fact that it appeared that the agency employed all the 
procedures required by 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976 ed.) and more, the court determined the proceedings to 
be inadequate and overturned the rule.”). 
115. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 541 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 653–54 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
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553] it must adopt to flesh out the record.”116 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court construed the D.C. Circuit’s opinion as holding that the 
procedures used during the rulemaking “were inadequate,” and the Court 
reversed on the basis that the D.C. Circuit had required the agency to use 
extra-statutory procedures.117 Rebuking the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme 
Court explained that “[t]he fundamental policy questions appropriately 
resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not subject to 
reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of 
agency action.”118  
Vermont Yankee has been read to have virtually no bearing on the 
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. That is because Vermont 
Yankee separated the issue of whether courts could impose extra-
statutory procedures for informal rulemaking from the issue of whether 
the agency had acted arbitrarily or capriciously: The Court stated that, on 
remand, the D.C. Circuit was “entirely free” to find that the rule adopted 
by the agency was “arbitrary and capricious.”119  
Vermont Yankee therefore rejected the D.C. Circuit’s procedural hard 
look without addressing the validity of the quasi-procedural or 
substantive hard looks. This is because neither the quasi-procedural nor 
substantive hard look doctrine purports to impose extra-statutory 
procedures in violation of Vermont Yankee. Rather, both involve 
reference to the record of an agency’s rulemaking process to determine 
whether an agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Vermont Yankee 
did not explicitly answer whether courts could review “the inadequacy 
of the record to support the agency decision.”120 The inadequacy of 
support in the record may implicate the amount of procedure used “if 
one chooses to regard certain evidence as inherently unreliable unless it 
has been subjected to particular procedural tests.”121 Stated another way, 
a court could find that an agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously by not 
establishing a record for appellate review that adequately responded to 
public comments, considered alternatives, or examined relevant 
factors—even though APA section 553 does not require the agency to 
                                                     
116. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 653 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558. 
117. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 542. 
118. Id. at 558. 
119. Id. at 535 n.14 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976)). 
120. Scalia, supra note 48, at 354. 
121. Id. 
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create a contemporaneous record or respond to public comments.122 So 
while Vermont Yankee came down hard on the D.C. Circuit, it was still 
unclear whether the D.C. Circuit’s quasi-procedural and substantive hard 
look doctrines survived Vermont Yankee.123 
b. State Farm Lists Criteria for Invalidating Agency Action, 
Without Addressing Quasi-Procedural or Substantive Hard 
Look 
Finally, in 1983, the Supreme Court provided some gloss on the 
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard in State Farm, which remains 
the Court’s definitive case on arbitrary and capricious review. Most of 
this gloss, however, was dicta. Moreover, the parties were focused on 
whether the arbitrary and capricious standard was equivalent to 
minimum rationality review or no review at all in the context of agency 
deregulation; they were not focused on the precise contours of a 
heightened standard for judicial review of agency rulemaking that went 
beyond the standard applied to legislation.124  
State Farm held that the Court would not treat agency rulemaking as 
the equivalent of legislation, thereby rejecting the minimum rationality 
approach to arbitrary and capricious review.125 And State Farm nixed the 
argument that deregulation should be treated like agency inaction, which 
                                                     
122. Cf. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(requiring an agency to create a contemporaneous record during informal rulemaking and to respond 
to any cogent public comments).  
123. See Garland, supra note 47, at 529 & n.128 (“The critical question for the hard look doctrine 
was whether Vermont Yankee’s proscription of ‘extra procedural devices’ applied to the 
requirements that an agency explain itself, examine objections and relevant factors, and consider 
alternatives. Opponents of the doctrine argued it did.” (citing Public Sys. v. Fed. Energy Reg. 
Comm’n, 606 F.2d 973, 983, 984, 986 (Robb, J., dissenting))); id. at 530 (“The Supreme Court’s 
own view regarding the validity of the quasi-procedural requirements was unclear.”). 
124. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., et al., at 12–
19, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (No. 82-354), 
available at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 354 (U.S. Feb. 7, 1983), at *27–36 (arguing against the 
Federal Parties’ position that the arbitrary and capricious standard meant rational basis review and 
against the petitioners’ view that agency deregulation was unreviewable because it was more like 
agency inaction). 
125. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9 (“The Department of Transportation suggests that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear 
under the Due Process Clause. We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality 
afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in 
fulfilling its statutory mandate.”). 
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would have made deregulation basically unreviewable.126 But the 
contours of the heightened standard adopted in State Farm largely 
remain a mystery. 
In State Farm, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
had rescinded its regulation that had required new cars to include passive 
restraints—airbags, detachable automatic seatbelts, or nondetachable 
automatic seatbelts.127 The agency explained that it could no longer 
conclude that the safety benefits from the passive restraint regulation 
would outweigh the approximately $1 billion it would cost the 
automobile industry to comply with this regulation.128 According to the 
agency, when it initially promulgated the passive restraint regulation, it 
estimated that sixty percent of new cars would be equipped with airbags 
and forty percent would be equipped with automatic seatbelts; however, 
by 1981, when it rescinded the regulation, the industry planned to 
comply with the passive restraint regulation by installing detachable 
automatic seatbelts in ninety-nine percent of new cars.129 While 
detachable automatic seatbelts did comply with the regulation, the 
agency reasoned that achieving compliance in this manner would not 
result in significant safety benefits because the detachable belts required 
“the same type of affirmative action that is the stumbling block to 
obtaining high usage levels of manual belts.”130 The Court unanimously 
invalidated the rescission of the airbag and nondetachable seatbelt 
alternatives, and, by a 5–4 vote invalidated the rescission of the 
detachable seatbelt alternative.131  
Just like Overton Park, State Farm began its exposition on arbitrary 
and capricious review by noting that the standard was “narrow,” but 
explained that “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate 
a satisfactory explanation for its action.”132 Instead of simply deciding 
that some heightened standard applied and then providing only the 
dispositive factor for deciding the case, State Farm rattled off a list of 
criteria—in dicta—that courts could use to find agency action arbitrary 
                                                     
126. Id. at 41–42. 
127. Id. at 37–38. 
128. Id. at 38–39. 
129. Id. at 38. 
130. Id. at 39 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,421 (Oct. 29, 1981)). 
131. Id. at 54; id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
132. Id. at 43 (majority opinion). 
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or capricious133: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if 
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision 
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view 
or the product of agency expertise.134 
Because State Farm’s dicta criteria for invalidating agency action 
look quite similar to some of the reasons given by the D.C. Circuit for 
invalidating agency action, many have posited that State Farm endorsed 
both the quasi-procedural and substantive hard look doctrines.135 Plus, 
the Court distinguished Vermont Yankee on the basis that State Farm’s 
arbitrary and capricious test did not “require . . . any specific 
procedures” for the agency to use, which was a rationale frequently 
invoked under the D.C. Circuit’s quasi-procedural hard look.136 
Distinguishing State Farm from Vermont Yankee on the basis that State 
Farm was not requiring any specific procedures is especially peculiar 
because Vermont Yankee had rejected that precise rationale.137 
Moreover, in the portion of State Farm that only five Justices joined, the 
Court stated that agency action must be “supported by the record and 
reasonably explained,” such that the Court could conclude that the 
agency engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking.”138 And these same five 
Justices even quoted the D.C. Circuit’s seminal substantive hard look 
decision, Greater Boston, approvingly.139  
But multiple facets of State Farm suggest that the Supreme Court was 
                                                     
133. See Garland, supra note 47, at 545 (describing State Farm as “[r]eciting a veritable litany of 
[quasi-procedural] requirements”). 
134. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
135. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 47, at 543 (“On one level, the State Farm decision is a ringing 
endorsement of the quasi-procedural hard look.”); id. at 545 (recognizing that both elements of the 
substantive hard look—scrutiny of the agency’s record and a heightened standard of review going 
beyond minimum rationality—appeared in State Farm); Warren, supra note 49, 2631 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court finally used the substantive hard look standard to overturn an agency action in [State 
Farm].”). 
136. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50–51. 
137. See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text. 
138. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52. 
139. Id. at 57 (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 
1971)). 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking 
447 
not completely signing on to the D.C. Circuit’s quasi-procedural and 
substantive hard look doctrines. For one thing, the Supreme Court has 
not used the label “hard look” to describe APA arbitrary and capricious 
review after State Farm, whereas the Court does use “hard look” to 
explain the additional procedures required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act.140 State Farm also clarified that, contrary to 
quasi-procedural hard look, it was not requiring an agency “to consider 
all policy alternatives in reaching [a] decision.”141 Rather, the Court 
made it abundantly clear that the deregulatory posture of the case 
required the agency to consider the rescinded alternatives.142 In other 
words, the agency needed to consider the rescinded alternatives only 
because it had previously made the factual finding that airbags and 
automatic seatbelts were a cost-effective way of savings lives.  
Once one accepts this unique rule that an agency must consider a 
rescinded alternative based on a previous factual finding made by the 
agency, most of State Farm becomes a simple case under Chenery. The 
agency’s explanation of the rescission did not address airbags or 
nondetachable automatic seatbelts. The obvious flaw in the agency’s 
reasoning for rescinding the entire regulation is that airbags or 
nondetachable seatbelts may have improved car safety, even if 
detachable seatbelts would not have. Combining State Farm’s 
deregulation rule that an agency must consider the rescinded alternatives 
based on a previous factual finding, with Chenery’s requirement that the 
agency must provide the explanation for its actions, shows why the 
agency in State Farm should have explained why a regulation requiring 
new cars to have airbags or nondetachable seatbelts would not have 
resulted in significant safety benefits. Because the agency did not 
address airbags or nondetachable automatic seatbelts whatsoever, the 
rescission of those alternatives was illogical and would have failed under 
Chenery’s rational basis with bite approach.143 Indeed, all nine 
                                                     
140. See supra note 108. 
141. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51. 
142. See id. at 51 (“But the airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive restraint 
standard: it is a technological alternative within the ambit of the existing standard. We hold only 
that given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial life-saving 
technology, the mandatory passive-restraint rule may not be abandoned without any consideration 
whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement.”). 
143. By way of analogy, assume a cook put pepperoni, sausage, and mushrooms on your frozen 
pizza. Before putting it into the oven, the cook asks you whether you want all three of those 
toppings. You respond, “I don’t like mushrooms, so please take off the mushrooms, pepperoni, and 
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Justices—including Justice Rehnquist who wrote Vermont Yankee—held 
that the rescission of the airbag and nondetachable seatbelt alternatives 
was arbitrary and capricious.144 
State Farm’s 5–4 split over the detachable seatbelt alternative145 was 
the significant dispute in the case that could not be resolved simply by 
Chenery, because the agency did explain why it rescinded this 
alternative.146 As the agency indicated, “[o]nce a detachable automatic 
belt is detached, it becomes identical to a manual belt.”147 Thus, if a 
person detaches the automatic belt, “its use thereafter requires the same 
type of affirmative action that is the stumbling block to obtaining high 
usage levels of manual belts.”148 Justice White’s majority opinion held 
the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously because it did not account for 
“inertia” favoring seatbelt use based on the fact that “the passive belt, 
once reattached, will continue to function automatically unless again 
disconnected.”149 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, which was joined by three 
other Justices, acknowledged that the agency’s explanation was “by no 
means a model.”150 Yet it found the explanation “adequate” because it 
articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.”151  
Regardless of who has the better of that debate, note that Justice 
White’s majority opinion did not actually use or endorse the D.C. 
Circuit’s hard look doctrine and it did not use most of the criteria for 
                                                     
sausage.” That is the same form of illogical reasoning used by the agency in State Farm. 
144. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In 
particular, I agree that, since the airbag and [nondetachable] automatic seatbelt were explicitly 
approved in the standard the agency was rescinding, the agency should explain why it declined to 
leave those requirements intact. In this case, the agency gave no explanation at all. Of course, if the 
agency can provide a rational explanation, it may adhere to its decision to rescind the entire 
standard.”). 
145. See id. at 58 (“I do not believe, however, that NHTSA’s view of detachable automatic 
seatbelts was arbitrary and capricious.”). 
146. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,421–54,326 (Oct. 29, 1981), cited in State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58–59 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
147. 46 Fed. Reg. at 53,421. 
148. Id., quoted in State Farm, 463 U.S. at 39. 
149. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 54; see also Brief of Respondents, supra note 124, at 40, available 
at LEXIS 1982 U.S. Briefs 354, at *70 (“Since detachable automatic belts overcome these causes 
and put inertia on the side of wearing belts, the assumption that detachables would do no better than 
manual belts is contrary to the record.”).  
150. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
151. Id. at 58–59 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
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invalidating agency action that it had previously listed in dicta—i.e., it 
did not make reference to the agency “rel[ying] on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider” or “offer[ing] an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is 
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.”152 The majority’s dispositive holding 
basically turned on the criterion of the agency’s “fail[ure] to consider an 
important aspect of the problem”153—inertia, a real-world aspect about 
the nature of detachable automatic seatbelts. While Justice White 
referenced the rulemaking record material, he explicitly noted that the 
agency had the discretion to ignore the empirical evidence at issue.154 
The majority’s holding did not turn on a requirement that the agency 
produce additional data, respond to more comments, or consider other 
statutory purposes—as the hard look doctrine would have required. 
Moreover, it did not foreclose the agency from providing an explanation 
of why the inertia from detachable seatbelts actually would not result in 
increased seatbelt usage.155  
To be sure, the State Farm majority used a stricter standard for 
reviewing agency rulemaking than the dissent, but the precise contours 
of that stricter standard remained unclear. What emerged from State 
Farm was not that the Supreme Court adopted any part of the D.C. 
Circuit’s hard look doctrine wholesale. Rather, State Farm (1) 
established that agency deregulation is reviewed under the APA’s 
arbitrary and capricious standard, (2) rejected the minimum rationality 
approach to arbitrary and capricious review, and (3) required an agency 
to consider a rescinded alternative based on a previous factual finding 
made by the agency. Of course, one year later, the Supreme Court in 
Chevron changed these rules of APA arbitrary and capricious review in 
                                                     
152. Id. at 43 (majority opinion). 
153. Id.  
154. Both Justice White’s majority opinion and Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion agreed that 
the agency had the discretion to ignore a survey of drivers showing that detachable seatbelts were 
used twice as much as manual belts, because that study had sample problems and the conditions 
differed from typical cars. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 53 (“We believe that it is within the agency’s 
discretion to pass upon the generalizability of these field studies.”); id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is reasonable for the agency to decide that this study 
does not support any conclusion concerning the effect of automatic seatbelts . . . .”). 
155. See id. at 54 (majority opinion) (whether inertia from detachable seatbelts would increase 
seatbelt usage “is a matter for the agency to decide, but it must bring its expertise to bear on the 
question”). 
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cases involving an agency’s statutory interpretation.  
c. Chevron Creates a Large Exception to State Farm 
Most see Chevron as solely a case about deference to agency statutory 
interpretations. But Chevron actually involved a specific type of 
arbitrary and capricious review—review of an agency’s interpretation of 
a statute it administers.156 Chevron referred to the arbitrary and 
capricious standard157 while never mentioning State Farm.158 After 
viewing Chevron as an arbitrary and capricious review case, one can 
also see that Chevron created a large escape hatch from Chenery’s 
requirement that an agency must explain its actions and from State 
Farm’s list of criteria in dicta for invalidating agency rulemaking.159  
Chevron announced a two-step inquiry for reviewing an “agency’s 
construction of the statute which it administers.”160 First (“Chevron Step 
One”), courts “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”161 Second (“Chevron Step Two”), “if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”162 So, for purposes of Chevron, an agency need not 
                                                     
156. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that Chevron 
Step Two was State Farm’s arbitrary and capricious standard); Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 
(D.C Cir. 1995) (“Chevron review and arbitrary and capricious review overlap at the margins. But it 
would be a mistake to view this case as one involving typical Chevron review.”). See also Garland, 
supra note 47, at 550 (“But the line between reviewing the validity of an agency’s statutory 
interpretations and reviewing the reasonableness of its policies is often a fine one . . . . The 
teachings of Chevron, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inapplicable to the arbitrary and capricious 
test.”); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1253, 1254 (1997) (proposing that Chevron Step Two and the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test 
“be deemed not just overlapping, but identical”). 
157. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(stating that reasonable agency interpretations warranted deference unless they were “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”). 
158. See Garland, supra note 47, at 550 (“The Court treated Chevron purely as a case of statutory 
construction—neither State Farm nor the APA was even mentioned—and arguably the two cases 
can be distinguished on that ground.”). 
159. Compare Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418–20 (1992) 
(deferring to the agency under Chevron), with id. at 425–27 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
agency action was invalid under State Farm).  
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
161. Id. at 843. 
162. Id. 
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articulate the connection between its interpretation and the statutory 
language, as “a court may not substitute its own construction of a 
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”163  
Chevron therefore revitalized the minimum rationality approach to 
arbitrary and capricious review in the context of agency statutory 
interpretation.164 By not requiring the agency to explain why it 
interpreted a statute in a certain manner, Chevron implicitly created an 
exception to Chenery’s holding that the agency must provide the 
explanation to justify its act. On the other hand, how one interprets the 
term “reasonable” determines whether the Chevron test looks more like 
rational basis review of legislation (i.e., minimum rationality review) or 
the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. If Chevron Step Two is interpreted 
as a return to minimum rationality review in the narrow context of 
agency statutory interpretation, Chevron creates at least one escape hatch 
from the more stringent State Farm inquiry. Chevron seemed to suggest 
that this was in fact how to interpret Chevron Step Two, as the Court 
went to great lengths to emphasize the deference that should be accorded 
to agencies.165  
Then again, the Supreme Court recently added another prong to the 
Chevron inquiry—“Chevron Step Zero.” Chevron Step Zero reduces 
deference to agency statutory interpretations made through less formal 
means than notice-and-comment rulemaking (such as guidance 
documents and ruling letters) by examining factors that look a lot like 
the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.166 The Court, however, has 
                                                     
163. Id. at 844 (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (reasonable agency interpretation still accorded deference even if 
it contradicts a court’s previous interpretation). Of course, a change in agency position (like 
deregulation) made through statutory interpretation could still be invalidated pursuant to State 
Farm, even though the position would be reasonable under Chevron.  
164. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 921, 922–23 (2007) (“[Chevron’s] connection to the State Farm dissent implies that 
hard-look review should have been moderated by Chevron’s broad acceptance of the role of the 
political branches in determining policy. After Chevron, in effect, hard-look review was supposed to 
be more bark than bite.”). 
165. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.” (footnote omitted)). 
166. See Keller, supra note 57, at 68–69 (discussing Chevron Step Zero and explaining that 
Chevron deference could be rejected if the agency lacked expertise, changed positions, did not 
carefully consider the relevant issues, or was addressing an important issue) (citing Gonzales v. 
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explained that agency notice-and-comment rulemaking will always pass 
the Chevron Step Zero doctrine for deference, so that development has 
basically not affected judicial review of agency rulemaking.167 
*  *  * 
State Farm and its Chevron exception represent the Court’s reaction 
to the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine, and thus the two cases became 
the definitive precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review. But 
State Farm and Chevron left lower courts without much guidance on 
how to review agency action. State Farm opened the door for courts to 
scrutinize the substantive policy decisions made by agencies, but then 
Chevron instructed lower courts to apply minimum rationality review to 
agency statutory interpretation. As many, including then-Judge Breyer, 
noted, that combination set up a doctrine for review of agency action 
that seemed completely backwards: Courts were to defer to agencies on 
questions of law relating to statutory interpretation, but were to nitpick 
substantive agency policy conclusions on matters in which judges lacked 
institutional competence.168 In the twenty-five years after State Farm 
and Chevron were decided, the Court offered virtually no other guidance 
on APA arbitrary and capricious review. But the Court’s recent decision 
in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. has finally provided lower courts 
with additional guidance on how to review agency action. Fox 
Television has replaced State Farm as the Court’s definitive precedent 
on APA arbitrary and capricious review. 
3. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. Implicitly Rejects the D.C. 
Circuit’s Hard Look Doctrine and Eliminates State Farm’s 
Criteria for Invalidating Agency Action 
The Supreme Court’s April 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. significantly limited the discretion of courts to invalidate 
agency action.169 In doing so, the Court implicitly rejected the D.C. 
                                                     
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 
(2000))). 
167. See id. at 67–68 & nn.117–18 (explaining that Chevron Step Zero will not reduce the 
deference accorded to agencies when the agencies engage in informal rulemaking). 
168. Steven Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 
388–94 (1986).  
169. Fox Television did not involve an informal rulemaking, but rather an adjudication. FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1807–08 (2009). 
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Circuit’s hard look doctrine and the State Farm dicta criteria for 
invalidating agency action.  
While enforcing the statutory ban on broadcasting “any . . . 
indecent . . . language,”170 the FCC had taken the position that it would 
not penalize broadcasters who aired a fleeting expletive—the nonliteral 
use of language describing sexual or excretory activities, which was also 
not “deliberate [or] repetitive.”171 More simply, the FCC had not 
penalized the broadcasting of a single use of the “F-Word” or “S-Word” 
that was made in passing.172 In 2004, the FCC changed its position and 
stated that it would start penalizing the broadcasting of fleeting 
expletives.173 The agency explicitly acknowledged and overruled its 
prior position.174 In supporting this change, the FCC explained that “any 
use of [the F-Word] . . . inherently has a sexual connotation,” such that 
the word is “patently offensive” because “[i]ts use invariably invokes a 
coarse sexual image.”175 The agency also stated that categorical 
exemptions for fleeting expletives would “likely lead to more 
widespread use,” and technological advances had made it easier to 
“bleep out” single uses of vulgar words.176 In 2006, the FCC issued an 
order finding that Fox Television Stations had broadcast indecent 
language by airing two different programs that both included fleeting 
expletives.177 The agency further explained that its pre-2004 position on 
fleeting expletives “d[id] not make sense in light of the fact that an 
‘expletive’s’ power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory 
meaning.”178 And the FCC noted that an exemption for fleeting 
expletives “‘unfairly forces viewers (including children)’ to take ‘the 
first blow’ and would allow broadcasters ‘to air expletives at all hours of 
                                                     
Nevertheless, Fox Television still addressed the APA arbitrary and capricious standard that applies 
to agency rulemaking, including informal rulemaking.  
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 
171. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1807. 
172. Id. at 1806–08. 
173. Id. at 1807 (citing In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their 
Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4975–76 (2004) [hereinafter 
Golden Globes Order]). 
174. Id. at 1808. 
175. Id. at 1807–08 (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4978, 4979). 
176. Id. at 1808 (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4979, 4980). 
177. Id. at 1808–09 (citing In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between 
February 2, 2002, and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,299 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order]). 
178. Id. at 1809 (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,308). 
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a day so long as they did so one at a time.’”179 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s change in 
position regarding fleeting expletives was not arbitrary or capricious 
under the APA.180 More importantly, the Court implicitly rejected the 
State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency action. Neither Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion nor Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion ever 
mentioned the State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency action, 
and both opinions adopted quite limited readings of State Farm. Justice 
Scalia explained that an agency’s change in position is not subjected to 
more heightened review than an agency acting in the first instance,181 
and that State Farm “said only” that an agency’s rescission of a prior 
regulation was reviewable (unlike an agency’s decision not to act in the 
first instance).182 Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote for the 
Fox Television majority, even limited State Farm to cases involving an 
agency that made prior factual findings.183 Consequently, the majority 
quoted State Farm merely for the proposition that APA arbitrary and 
capricious review is “narrow,” it requires an agency to “examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action,” and 
it does not allow a court “to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.”184  
Adding additional support for the proposition that the majority 
implicitly rejected the State Farm dicta criteria, Justice Breyer’s dissent 
quoted the State Farm dicta185 and would have invalidated the FCC’s 
change in position on the basis that the agency failed to “consider . . . 
                                                     
179. Id. (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,309). 
180. Id. at 1819. 
181. See id. at 1810 (“State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a 
policy change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in 
the first instance.”). 
182. Id. 
183. See id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing 
State Farm articulated the principle that “an agency’s decision to change course may be arbitrary 
and capricious if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings without reasoned 
explanation for doing so” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1811 (majority opinion) (“This means 
that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a 
new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests 
upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy 
has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” (emphasis added)). 
184. Id. at 1810 (majority opinion) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
185. Id. at 1832 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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important aspect[s] of the problem.”186 Justice Breyer’s dissent would 
have required the agency to address (1) “the First-Amendment-related 
need to avoid ‘censorship’” because the “FCC had explicitly rested its 
prior policy in large part upon the need to avoid treading too close to the 
constitutional line,”187 and (2) the “potential impact of its new policy 
upon local broadcasting coverage.”188 Additionally, Justice Breyer 
would not have accepted the reasons that the FCC did give for its change 
in position (these expletives “always invoke a coarse excretory or sexual 
image,”189 viewers would suffer the “first blow,”190 and broadcasters 
could air expletives at all hours “so long as they did so one at a time”191), 
because the FCC would have been aware of all these rationales “the first 
time around” when it adopted its initial policy.192 
Unlike Justice Breyer, the majority did not treat the State Farm dicta 
as an obstacle to upholding the agency’s action. In the portion of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion that was not joined by Justice Kennedy, the plurality 
responded to Justice Breyer’s arguments based on the State Farm dicta, 
but the plurality never cited the State Farm dicta approvingly.193 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion completely ignored the State Farm dicta 
by not even addressing these arguments made by Justice Breyer.194 The 
fact that Justice Kennedy, who provided the dispositive fifth vote, did 
not even address the arguments premised on the State Farm dicta criteria 
confirms that Fox Television implicitly rejected the State Farm dicta 
criteria. 
In addition to implicitly rejecting the State Farm dicta criteria, Fox 
Television also implicitly rejected the D.C Circuit’s hard look doctrine. 
The majority did acknowledge “the requirement that an agency provide 
reasoned explanation for its action,”195 but the majority’s analysis 
clarified that its idea of “reasoned explanation”196 required much less 
                                                     
186. Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
187. Id. at 1833. 
188. Id. at 1835. 
189. Id. at 1838. 
190. Id. at 1812 (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 13,299, 13,309 (2006)).  
191. Id. at 1839 (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13,309). 
192. Id. at 1838. 
193. Id. at 1815–19 (plurality opinion). 
194. Id. at 1822–24 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
195. Id. at 1811 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
196. Id. 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:419, 2009 
456 
than the “reasoned decision-making” contemplated by the D.C. Circuit’s 
hard look doctrine.197 Recall that the substantive hard look doctrine 
required courts to scrutinize the record intensively,198 and the quasi-
procedural hard look doctrine required agencies to use additional 
procedures to produce better explanations.199 Instead of intensively 
scrutinizing the record, the Fox Television majority simply asked 
whether the agency’s reasons were “rational.”200 The majority did not 
force the agency to use additional procedures to produce a better 
explanation. Indeed, the majority did not require the agency “to adduce 
empirical data” when that data could not readily be obtained201 or when 
“the agency’s predictive judgment . . . makes entire sense.”202   
Ultimately, APA arbitrary and capricious review after Fox Television 
simply asks whether the agency’s reasons were “rational”—it does not 
require courts to take a hard look at agency action or go through the 
State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency action.203 Additionally, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion confirms that the agency itself 
still must provide the explanation, as Chenery required. Justice Kennedy 
explained that the APA imposes “the duty of agencies to find and 
formulate policies that can be justified by neutral principles and a 
reasoned explanation.”204 The “duty of agencies” language confirms the 
Chenery principle that the agency itself must provide the explanation, as 
opposed to allowing courts to come with hypothetical explanations after 
the fact. In fact, when Justice Kennedy quoted Overton Park for the 
proposition that APA arbitrary and capricious review is “searching and 
careful,” he was distinguishing administrative agencies’ unique 
                                                     
197. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.); 
see supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra notes 103–107 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
200. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1812–13; see id. at 1812 (“It was certainly reasonable to 
determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive 
words . . . .”); id. at 1812–13 (“It is surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe harbor 
for single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive language.’” (quoting 
Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4979 (2004))); id. at 1813 (“The Commission could 
rationally decide it needed to step away from its old regime . . . .”).  
201. Id. at 1813 
202. Id. at 1814 
203. Id. at 1812–13. 
204. Id. at 1822–23 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis 
added). 
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“constitutional position” compared to Congress,205 whose acts are only 
reviewed for minimum rationality, meaning that Congress itself does not 
have to provide an explanation for its action.  
Lower courts could start seizing on Justice Kennedy’s “neutral and 
rational principles” language to establish yet another hook for infusing 
their policy preferences into APA arbitrary and capricious review, but 
that would be a gross over-reading of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.206 
Justice Kennedy signed on to the majority opinion that merely required 
the agency’s explanation to be “rational,”207 calling the majority’s 
discussion a “careful and complete analysis.”208 Just as Justice Rehnquist 
had noted in State Farm,209 Justice Kennedy explained that the agency’s 
explanation in Fox Television was sufficient even though it was “not so 
precise, detailed, or elaborate as to be a model for agency 
explanation.”210 
Fox Television significantly reduces the ability of courts to impose 
their policy preferences on agencies and to invalidate agency action. 
However, because the majority did not establish a doctrine underlying 
APA arbitrary and capricious review and Justice Kennedy did not sign 
on to the entire majority opinion, lower courts may still have difficulties 
in applying Fox Television. The Supreme Court and lower courts may 
very well have to articulate a comprehensive, thorough doctrine for APA 
arbitrary and capricious review before courts stop using their policy 
preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking. 
II. COURTS REVIEWING AGENCY RULEMAKING SHOULD 
USE THE DOCTRINES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
LEGISLATION 
Before Fox Television, the law on arbitrary and capricious review was 
in shambles and had given judges too much leeway to impose their 
                                                     
205. Id. 
206. Id.  
207. Id. at 1812–13 (majority opinion). 
208. Id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
209. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 58 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the agency’s explanation was 
sufficient even though it was “by no means a model”). 
210. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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policy preferences on agencies. That was largely due to the fact that 
courts had not recognized the principles underlying their review of 
agency rulemaking and they stopped using the doctrines for judicial 
review of legislation when reviewing agency rulemaking. Essentially, 
when courts recognized that agency rulemaking differed in significant 
respects from legislation,211 they went too far in severing the connection 
between the doctrines for review of agency rulemaking and 
legislation.212 Without a theoretical grounding, arbitrary and capricious 
review of agency rulemaking became highly politicized. The most direct 
remedy for this problem is doctrinal innovations that will limit the 
ability of judges to use their policy preferences to invalidate agency 
rules.213  
While Fox Television provided guidance to courts regarding what 
they cannot do, there is still a void as to what doctrine or underlying 
principles courts should use in conducting APA arbitrary and capricious 
review. This Article argues that, after Fox Television, courts should 
place APA arbitrary and capricious review on the tiers-of-scrutiny 
sliding scale used for review of legislation, even though courts should 
not equate arbitrary and capricious review with the minimum rationality 
test used for reviewing most legislation. The significant differences 
between agency rulemaking and legislation do warrant a more nuanced 
doctrine than merely treating agency rulemaking as the equivalent of 
legislation.214 This observation, though, does not entail an either-or 
proposition: Courts can—and should—develop doctrines for judicial 
review of agency rulemaking by using doctrines for review of 
legislation, even if courts should not treat agency rulemaking as the 
equivalent of legislation.  
This Part begins with background information on the tiers of scrutiny, 
which is the current doctrine for judicial review of legislation. It then 
proceeds to give both practical and theoretical reasons why arbitrary and 
                                                     
211. See supra Part I.B. 
212. See supra Part I.C. 
213. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law 24 (Univ. of 
Chicago Pub. Law Working Paper No. 223, Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 143, Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-16, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150404 (“And if arbitrariness review is being conducted in a way that 
shows a significant effect from judicial policy preferences, then the most obvious response would be 
to reduce the intensity of such review. What is now a ‘hard look’ on the part of reviewing courts 
might be transformed into a ‘soft look.’”). 
214. See supra notes 52–67 and accompanying text. 
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capricious review should be tied to the tiers of scrutiny. Practically, 
arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm has left lower courts in 
disarray and has politicized judicial review of agency rulemaking. 
Theoretically, the Supreme Court is signaling that the APA’s arbitrary 
and capricious standard should be interpreted as it was understood by 
Congress when it passed the APA. This would entail a return to Pacific 
States Box’s focus on an agency’s purpose in regulating and the means 
used to achieve that purpose, even if agency rulemaking is not treated as 
the equivalent as legislation. The doctrines for review of legislation 
already provide a nuanced framework—based on over a century of trial-
and-error—for evaluating the purpose and means used in creating 
legislative-like pronouncements.  
A. The Tiers of Scrutiny for Reviewing Legislation 
It is settled constitutional law that judicial review of legislation is 
based on the tiers of scrutiny, but it took over a century to solidify the 
precedent underlying the tiers of scrutiny. The tiers of scrutiny require 
courts to analyze the means and the ends of legislation by asking 
whether the governmental purpose rises to the requisite level (the ends) 
and whether the legislation has the requisite connection to that purpose 
(the means).215 Currently, the Court recognizes three different levels of 
scrutiny.216 In determining which level of scrutiny to use, courts look to 
various factors: the original understanding of the Constitution,217 the 
institutional competence of courts to second-guess legislatures,218 
whether courts in future cases would be required to apply heightened 
scrutiny in an unprincipled manner that would open a “Pandora’s 
box,”219 whether a deficiency in the political process exists,220 and 
                                                     
215. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 59, at 425 (Under the tiers of scrutiny, courts analyze “the 
rationality of legislative purposes and means chosen to achieve them.”). 
216. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related 
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern 
Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 225–26 (2002) (“[T]raditional black-letter law 
continues to discuss three basic standards of review—minimum rationality review, intermediate or 
mid-level review, and strict scrutiny . . . .”). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 529 (Aspen Law & Bus. Publishers 1997). 
217. See Kelso, supra note 216, at 229 n.19 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 
(1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
218. See id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985)).  
219. Id. (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445–46). 
220. See id. at 229 n.20 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
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whether the legislation affects an immutable characteristic221 or “burdens 
an individual for something not the product of that individual’s 
choice.”222 
A small proportion of legislation will be reviewed under “strict 
scrutiny,” which requires that the legislation serve a compelling 
governmental purpose and be narrowly tailored to serve that purpose.223 
Strict scrutiny applies to “[c]lassifications based on race or national 
origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights.”224 
“Intermediate scrutiny” is more deferential to legislation than strict 
scrutiny, but courts can still easily invalidate legislation under this 
standard. Under intermediate scrutiny, the legislation must serve an 
important governmental purpose and be substantially related to that 
purpose.225 Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral restrictions 
of speech,226 classifications based on illegitimacy,227 and classifications 
based on sex.228  
“Rational basis” review is the most deferential doctrine for reviewing 
legislation, as it merely requires that the legislation has a legitimate 
governmental purpose and is rationally related to that purpose.229 Unlike 
strict and intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court has held that courts 
reviewing legislation for a rational basis can consider any conceivable, 
hypothetical governmental purpose that the legislature could have had in 
mind;230 this approach to rational basis review has become known as 
                                                     
(1938)). 
221. See id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
222. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982)). 
223. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997) (describing “strict scrutiny” as 
requiring legislation to be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest”).  
224. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to the fundamental right of privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications).  
225. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that intermediate scrutiny 
requires the legislation to “serve important governmental objectives and . . . be substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives”). 
226. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). 
227. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1982). 
228. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
229. See, e.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (explaining that the “rational-
basis test” requires legislation to be “rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective”). 
230. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (stating that courts 
could consider any “conceivable” purpose under rational basis review, and “because we never 
require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for 
 
Keller_Article_DTPed[1].docx (Do Not Delete) 8/31/2009  7:40 PM 
Depoliticizing Review of Rulemaking 
461 
“minimum rationality” review.231 Most legislation will be reviewed for a 
rational basis, as anything not triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny is 
subject to rational basis review.232  
While the Supreme Court has only articulated these three levels of 
scrutiny,233 many commentators have suggested that there are really 
other levels of scrutiny for reviewing legislation.234 Most importantly, 
the Court’s precedents suggest a heightened variant of rational basis 
review, which this Article will call “rational basis with bite.”235 Under 
rational basis with bite, courts use the rational basis standard, which 
examines whether the purpose is legitimate and the means are rationally 
related to that purpose.236 Rational basis with bite, however, does not 
adopt the minimum rationality approach that examines any conceivable, 
hypothetical purposes237—rather, rational basis with bite only examines 
the actual purpose motivating the legislature, as evidenced by the record 
created by the legislature.238  
                                                     
constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually 
motivated the legislature”). 
231. See Kelso, supra note 216, at 230 (describing “minimum rationality” review as examining 
any “conceivable legitimate interest to support the statute”). 
232. See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 (“In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory 
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional 
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state 
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”). 
233. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (stating that the three 
“traditionally expressed levels” of scrutiny are “strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, [and] rational 
basis”). 
234. See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 216, at 226 (arguing that the Supreme Court should recognize 
seven levels of scrutiny, but that the Court has applied ten different levels of scrutiny). The other 
levels of scrutiny proposed by Kelso are hybrid standards that use portions of the intermediate 
scrutiny standard and portions of the strict scrutiny standard. See id. at 258 (“Appendix”). As this 
Article ultimately rejects applying intermediate or strict scrutiny, it will not consider the hybrid 
variations based on those two levels of scrutiny.  
235. The term rational basis “with bite” stems from its use by Gerald Gunther in Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972). Gunther explained that the Court could put “new bite into the old equal 
protection” by not “supply[ing] justifying rationales by exercising its imagination.” Id.; see also 
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486-87 (16th ed., Foundation Press 2007) 
(discussing rational basis with bite); see generally infra note 238. 
236. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
238. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[T]he record 
does not reveal any rational basis . . . .”); see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–35 (1996) 
(examining the actual legislative purpose instead of creating a hypothetical, conceivable purpose); 
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The Court has not yet recognized the existence of rational basis with 
bite, much less defined when rational basis with bite applies instead of 
minimum rationality in the context of reviewing legislation.239 Generally 
speaking, rational basis with bite has applied in cases with two features: 
(1) they involve a classification to which the Court does not want lower 
courts applying intermediate or strict scrutiny, given institutional 
competence concerns and the fear of opening a Pandora’s box;240 (2) but 
the law at issue nevertheless blatantly “burdens an individual for 
something not the product of that individual’s choice.”241 In other words, 
rational basis with bite has been applied when there was both a plausible 
argument for applying heightened scrutiny and also reasons for the Court 
to worry about subjecting the law at issue to heightened scrutiny—that 
is, because lower courts could over-use their power of judicial review to 
strike down other pieces of legislation that the Court would consider 
valid.242 
                                                     
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982) (same); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535, 
538 (1973) (same); see also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“A challenged classification may be sustained only if it is rationally related to 
achievement of an actual legitimate governmental purpose.”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1194 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), rev’d 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“By rational basis, I don’t mean the standard applied to economic 
regulations, where courts shut their eyes to reality or even invent justifications for upholding 
government programs, but robust and realistic rational basis review, where courts consider the 
actual reasons for the plan in light of the real-world circumstances that gave rise to it.” (citations 
omitted)). See generally Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. 
L. REV. 801, 803, 814–15 (2006) (explaining “the Court’s schizophrenic oscillation” between 
minimum rationality and rational basis with bite). 
239. Some commentators have questioned whether courts can justifiably look to Congress’s 
legislative record in determining the constitutionality of a statute. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & 
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Review 
of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 375 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. 
Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN L. REV. 87, 140 (2001). 
240. See Kelso, supra note 216, at 229 n.19 (citing City of Cleburne, 437 U.S. at 443, 445–46). 
241. Id. at 229 n.20 (citing Plyler at 220); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that rational basis with bite applies “[w]hen a 
law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group” (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; City 
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)). 
242. In the context of criminal sentencing, federal courts of appeals may very well be treating 
district courts as if they were expert “agencies,” ever since the Supreme Court found that the 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional. Courts of appeals now essentially apply a 
rational basis with bite standard to appellate review of a district court’s sentence that is outside the 
Sentencing Guidelines range. Congress has required district courts to give a written explanation for 
all sentences given outside the Guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). The courts of appeals then 
review this explanation and the sentence under a reasonableness standard. See United States v. 
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B. Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking Should Be Based on the 
Tiers of Scrutiny 
It took the Court over a century to solidify the tiers of scrutiny243 
because the development of doctrines for review of legislative-like 
pronouncements needed to account for many factors, including the 
institutional competence of courts to review policy decisions made by 
governmental bodies entrusted with such decisions. One large limitation 
inherent in the tiers of scrutiny is that courts can only evaluate the 
purpose and means of a piece of legislation. Courts, for example, cannot 
require Congress to hold more hearings or examine different aspects of 
the underlying problem. Similar concerns regarding institutional 
competence surround judicial review of agency rulemaking, as unelected 
judges are reviewing the policy decisions made by the government body 
entrusted with making such decisions.  
However, rather than acknowledge and take advantage of the “[y]ears 
of refinement” that went into creating the tiers of scrutiny,244 the Court 
has not considered the use of the tiers of scrutiny to address these 
concerns regarding judicial review of agency rulemaking. Courts have 
not been limiting themselves to reviewing the agency’s purpose in 
regulating and the means used to achieve that purpose. Rather, State 
Farm’s dicta established a vague, open-ended list of criteria that 
essentially gives courts carte blanche to validate or invalidate agency 
rules.245 The courts of appeals have cited these State Farm criteria 
                                                     
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261–62 (2005). In fact, the same dispute in administrative law regarding how 
to define procedural versus substantive requirements, see supra notes 119–123 and accompanying 
text, is arising in the context of determining whether a criminal sentence should be reviewed as 
being “procedurally” versus “substantive[ly] reasonable[],” Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 
597 (2007). Compare Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(stating that an explanation for a sentence based on disliking Yankees fans would go to substantive 
reasonableness), with id. at 2483 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that such an explanation would go to procedural reasonableness). 
243. See supra note 43. 
244. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
35, 40 (1981); see id. (discussing the process by which the common law refines legal doctrines over 
many years in the context of contract and tort law).  
245. See Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee 
II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 419–21 (1981) (arguing that the Court should prevent courts from 
invalidating agency rules because of minor gaps or defects in the agency’s reasoning for the same 
reasons articulated in Vermont Yankee). 
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hundreds of times.246 While Fox Television took a step in the right 
direction by eliminating these State Farm criteria, it did not place the 
standard for reviewing agency rulemaking on the tiers-of-scrutiny 
sliding scale. For both practical and theoretical reasons, courts should 
take this additional step and place the APA’s arbitrary and capricious 
standard on the tiers-of-scrutiny sliding scale. 
Practically, the lower courts’ application of the APA’s arbitrary and 
capricious standard has proven that its doctrine for review of agency 
rulemaking is unprincipled and unmanageable. Within a decade after 
State Farm and Chevron, “the Chevron framework [had] broken down, 
and State Farm [had] been all but ignored by agencies and the courts, 
including the Supreme Court.”247 At times, the Supreme Court and the 
courts of appeals cite the State Farm criteria in applying the arbitrary 
and capricious standard, but the criteria are more often ignored.248 At the 
other extreme, the D.C. Circuit continues to use its hard look doctrine,249 
although it often hides this fact by not using the magic words “hard 
look” in invalidating agency action.250 Other circuits, as well, have 
routinely invoked the hard look doctrine.251 Confirming the disarray, 
                                                     
246. A simple Westlaw search on July 8, 2009, just for the phrase “failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, returned 300 cases in the federal 
courts of appeals.  
247. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive 
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1051–52 (1995). 
248. Id. at 1067. 
249. See, e.g., El Conejo Americano of Texas, Inc. v. DOT, 278 F.3d 17, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(invoking the “hard look” standard under arbitrary and capricious review).  
250. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
Commission offered no reasoned explanation for its dismissal of empirical data that was submitted 
at its invitation.”). 
251. See, e.g., Long Island Head Start Child Dev. Servs. v. NLRB, 460 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“applying State Farm ‘hard look’ standard to NLRB adjudication”); Citizens Coal Council v. 
EPA, 447 F.3d 879, 914 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“In conducting our 
review, we ‘intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in 
the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination 
of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has 
not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.’” (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. 
FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851–52 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Simms v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 45 
F.3d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Rather the court must ‘ensure that the agency took a “hard look” at 
all relevant issues and considered reasonable alternatives . . . .’” (quoting Neighborhood TV Co., 
Inc. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1984))); Frisby v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 755 
F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985) (“This presumption does not, however, prevent a reviewing court 
from taking a probing, ‘hard look’ at the agency’s action.”); Citizens State Bank of Marshfield, Mo. 
v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440, 1445 (8th Cir. 1983) (“We are not satisfied that the Board took a ‘hard 
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lower courts often selectively quote from Overton Park or State Farm 
for the proposition that arbitrary and capricious review is either 
“narrow” or more “probing”—but not both.252 D.C. Circuit Judge 
Kavanaugh may have summed it up best: 
Courts have incrementally expanded those APA [§ 553] 
procedural requirements well beyond what the text provides. 
And courts simultaneously have grown State Farm’s “narrow” § 
706 arbitrary-and-capricious review into a far more demanding 
test. Application of the beefed-up arbitrary-and-capricious test is 
inevitably if not inherently unpredictable—so much so that, on 
occasion, the courts’ arbitrary-and-capricious review itself 
appears arbitrary and capricious.253  
Chevron did not fare much better. Most lower courts interpreted 
Chevron as a return to minimum rationality review in cases involving 
agency statutory interpretation,254 although a significant number of D.C. 
                                                     
look’ at the relevant issues . . . .” (citing Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 852–53)). But see Nw. Envtl. 
Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 687 n.15 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because the 
Supreme Court has never explicitly embraced the ‘hard look’ approach to judicial review under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA, we adhere to the Supreme Court’s explicit guidance in 
State Farm that an agency must cogently explain its actions and demonstrate a rational connection 
between the facts it found and the choice it made.” (citation omitted)). 
252. A quick search on Westlaw in December 2008 revealed that Overton Park was cited 1642 
times in the federal courts of appeals. Eight hundred seventeen times, the court quoted Overton Park 
for the proposition that arbitrary and capricious review is narrow or that the court could not 
substitute its judgment for the agency’s judgment—but did not state that this review was thorough, 
probing, or in-depth. The opposite happened 107 times. The search was limited to federal courts of 
appeals cases citing Overton Park, and the locate terms of the search were <narrow substitute % 
(thorough probing in-depth)>. Similarly, State Farm was cited 1149 times in the federal courts of 
appeals. Three hundred eighty-three times, the court quoted State Farm for the proposition that 
arbitrary and capricious review is narrow or that the court could not substitute its judgment for the 
agency’s judgment—but did not list the State Farm criteria for invalidating agency action, thus 
failing to indicate that review is also “probing.” The opposite happened 134 times. The search was 
limited to federal courts of appeals cases citing State Farm, and the locate terms of the search were 
<narrow substitute % (“rel! on factors” “fail! to consider” “counter to the evidence” 
“implausible”)>. Fox Television may have settled that State Farm stands for “narrow” but not 
“probing” review, though, as the majority quoted State Farm for the proposition that arbitrary and 
capricious review is “narrow” without quoting State Farm for the proposition that it is also probing. 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009).  
253. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
254. See Levin, supra note 156, at 1266 n.59 (“[U]nder current law step two is so deferential as to 
be almost inconsequential . . . .” (citing Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing 
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 
(1994))). 
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Circuit cases infused the hard look doctrine into Chevron255 by 
continuing to equivocate on the term “reasonable.”256 However, to 
compound the ambiguity, the Supreme Court’s recent Chevron Step 
Zero doctrine reduced Chevron deference through factors that look a lot 
like the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine.257  
Empirical studies confirm that under State Farm and Chevron, the 
political policy preferences of judges significantly affects whether 
judges invalidate agency action.258 With such a muddled doctrine, this 
comes as no surprise, as there was leeway to apply individual policy 
preferences under indeterminate doctrines. Nevertheless, much of the 
commentary supporting the hard look doctrine and State Farm’s dicta 
has taken it on faith that judges would not let their political policy 
preferences cloud their judgments.259 Evidence to the contrary confirms 
that the Supreme Court was right in Fox Television to implicitly 
eliminate both the State Farm dicta criteria for invalidating agency 
action and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. Indeed, the major 
reason why Congress creates agencies is so that an expert set of 
decisionmakers—not judges—can set national policy.260 When judges 
overrule expert agencies because of judicial policy preferences, they 
                                                     
255. See id. at 1263 (“An important line of cases from the D.C. Circuit has implemented step two 
of the Chevron test through lines of argument that originated in abuse of discretion doctrine, often 
under banners such as ‘reasoned decisionmaking’ or the judicial ‘hard look.’”). 
256. See id. (“In effect, the [D.C. Circuit] has transformed the Chevron step two question of 
whether the agency action was ‘reasonable’ into a question of whether it was ‘reasoned.’”). 
257. See Keller, supra note 57, at 67–69 (discussing Chevron Step Zero and explaining that 
Chevron deference could be rejected if the agency lacked expertise, changed positions, did not 
carefully consider the relevant issues, or was addressing an important issue) (citing Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
258. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
259. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 47, at 558 (“[H]ard look review may be too hard because it 
may permit a court to substitute its judgment for the agency’s on the pretext of determining whether 
a policy outcome is ‘reasonable.’ . . . It is hard to rebut this charge directly, beyond asserting the 
good faith of the judiciary.”); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 59, at 438 (“It would, of course, be naive 
to suppose that [substantive hard look] can completely avoid the problem of judges finding flaws in 
agency reasoning because they dislike the result.”). 
260. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. 
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the 
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-
making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”). 
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eliminate the major advantage of having an administrative state in the 
first place.  
After Fox Television, these practical concerns about an unworkable 
doctrine for APA arbitrary and capricious review may disappear. But 
because the Supreme Court did not explicitly eliminate the State Farm 
criteria or the hard look doctrine and because lower courts could 
misinterpret Justice Kennedy’s Fox Television concurrence,261 lower 
courts might continue invalidating agency action based on their policy 
preferences. If so, the Supreme Court or lower courts will need to adopt 
a more robust doctrine, such as application of the tiers of scrutiny, that 
limits what criteria courts can look to, instead of merely setting a few 
examples on how to perform APA arbitrary and capricious review.  
In addition to these practical concerns, there are theoretical reasons 
for placing APA arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking 
on the tiers of scrutiny. Most importantly, courts need to return to 
focusing solely on the agency’s purpose in regulating and the means 
used by the agency to achieve that purpose. There is statutory support in 
the APA for this: APA Section 553, which establishes the procedures 
agencies must use during informal rulemaking, provides that the 
agency’s record only needs to include a “concise general statement of 
[the rule’s] basis and purpose.”262 When courts are given the leeway to 
require that agencies use additional procedures to formulate a more 
lengthy record for appellate review, judges can use their policy 
preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking under the guise of merely 
asking for a more thorough record. However, the ability of judges to use 
their policy preferences in reviewing agency rulemaking would be 
significantly constrained if judges could only examine the agency’s 
explanation about its purpose and means. Such an inquiry would focus 
simply on whether the agency invoked a regulatory purpose contained 
within its statutory delegation and whether the agency adequately 
explained how the rule it promulgated was sufficiently connected to that 
purpose.  
The hard look doctrine itself was basically “a surrogate for motivation 
analysis”263—that is, an analysis of the agency’s purpose to see whether 
                                                     
261. See supra notes 206–210 and accompanying text.  
262. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
263. Garland, supra note 47, at 555.  
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an “improper motive has intruded into the decisionmaking process.”264 
Courts’ main concern in reviewing agency rulemaking is the agency’s 
purpose, so the doctrines for judicial review of agency rulemaking 
should be simplified to focus directly on the agency’s purpose instead of 
proxies that do not necessarily implicate that purpose. Using the tiers of 
scrutiny in reviewing agency rulemaking would restore this direct focus 
on the agency’s purpose in rulemaking. 
Another theoretical concern is that courts applying the State Farm 
criteria and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine neglected to justify 
their doctrines for judicial review of agency rulemaking, as did the 
Supreme Court in Fox Television.265 There was no limiting principle to 
the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that courts give agency action a hard 
look—a hard look requirement can result in any outcome that a judge 
wants. Similarly, State Farm’s adoption in dicta of a non-exhaustive list 
of criteria for invalidating agency action allowed lower courts to 
overrule agencies whenever an agency “failed to consider” something 
that a court deemed to be “an important aspect of the problem.”266 Fox 
Television is a big improvement, but its fact-specific example of how to 
conduct APA arbitrary and capricious review could easily be 
distinguished by lower courts—even though Fox Television’s particular 
example of arbitrary and capricious review shows just how restrained 
courts must be when reviewing agency rulemaking. The tiers of scrutiny, 
though, provide judicial standards employed by courts in many other 
contexts, such as an objective reasonableness standard under rational 
basis review. One of the greatest advantages of adopting a tiers-of-
scrutiny approach to reviewing agency rulemaking is that courts could 
take advantage of cross-doctrinal precedents, which give content to the 
various standards contained within the tiers of scrutiny. 
Indeed, that is precisely what Congress was trying to do when it 
codified the arbitrary and capricious standard in the APA. Courts had 
been using the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing legislation, 
so Congress wanted courts to use that same, deferential standard when 
                                                     
264. Id. at 553. 
265. See Cross, supra note 13, at 1244 (“[T]he justification for some measure of [judicial review 
of rulemaking] is widely taken for granted.”). 
266. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see, 
e.g., Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466, 492 (6th Cir. 2008) (Cook, J., concurring); 
CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 195 n.25 (3d Cir. 2008); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 
F.3d 372, 420–21 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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reviewing agency action.267 This is extremely relevant to the modern 
Supreme Court, which has explained that the APA should be interpreted 
in accordance with the understanding of the APA when Congress passed 
it in 1946.268 The modern Court’s shift to interpreting the APA in 
accordance with the original understanding of the APA provides 
substantial support for applying the tiers of scrutiny used for reviewing 
legislation when reviewing agency rulemaking. 
Thus, for both practical and theoretical reasons, courts should place 
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard on the tiers of scrutiny. 
Courts reviewing agency rules would return to focusing solely on the 
agency’s purpose in regulating and the means used to achieve that 
purpose. Granted, there could still be some room for examining the 
agency’s rulemaking record or second-guessing the agency’s ultimate 
policy decision under a tiers-of-scrutiny approach to reviewing agency 
rulemaking. However, the degree to which courts would be able to do 
that depends on where arbitrary and capricious review is placed on the 
tiers of scrutiny. The next Part will address that question. Regardless of 
where arbitrary and capricious review is placed on the tiers of scrutiny, 
the doctrines for reviewing legislation should be used in reviewing 
agency rulemaking because they would significantly clarify and improve 
the doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking. 
III. COURTS REVIEWING AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER 
THE APA SHOULD USE THE RATIONAL BASIS WITH 
BITE STANDARD  
Ultimately, this Article argues that courts should equate APA 
arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking to the rational 
basis with bite standard used in reviewing legislation,269 an approach that 
                                                     
267. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
268. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (“A statutory intent that legislative 
departure from the norm must be clear suggests a need for similar clarity in respect to grandfathered 
common-law variations. The APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and 
diversity.”); id. at 165 (“Congress has set forth the appropriate standard in the APA.”); Dir., Office 
of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 275 (1994) (interpreting the 
APA’s use of the term “burden of proof” in accordance with 1930s and 1940s sources, and 
“presum[ing] Congress intended the phrase to have the meaning generally accepted in the legal 
community at the time of enactment”). 
269. This Article does not take a position on whether the rational basis with bite approach should 
be used when reviewing informal adjudication or subformal rulemaking (e.g., rules made through 
interpretive decisions or action letters—not through APA Section 553’s informal rulemaking 
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is supported by the Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. Under this rational basis with bite approach, courts would 
ask (1) whether the agency’s rule conforms to a legitimate statutory 
purpose and (2) whether the rule is rationally related to that purpose.270 
Importantly, courts would not be permitted to examine any conceivable, 
hypothetical statutory purposes, but only the actual purpose invoked by 
the agency in the rulemaking record.271 This Part first provides an 
argument for adopting rational basis with bite instead of the other 
standards on the tiers of scrutiny.272 It then applies the rational basis with 
bite approach to two recent court of appeals cases to show how the 
standard can bring clarity to this area of the law, which has been “more 
Rorschach than rule of law.”273  
A. Rational Basis with Bite Should be Used in Reviewing Agency 
Rulemaking—Instead of Minimum Rationality, Intermediate 
Scrutiny, or Strict Scrutiny 
Equating APA arbitrary and capricious review of agency rulemaking 
to the rational basis with bite approach has two primary advantages 
compared to other levels of scrutiny: (1) it balances the justification for 
heightened review of agency rulemaking with the need to limit judges’ 
                                                     
procedures) under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.  
270. See supra notes 235–238 and accompanying text. 
271. Some commentators have argued that courts should also be able to examine reasons given 
by the agency after the rulemaking process has finished (such as reasons provided during 
subsequent litigation). See, e.g., Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 1909, 1919 (2009). This argument is based primarily on the APA’s harmless (or prejudicial) 
error standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“[D]ue account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.”). Other commentators, though, justify the requirement that an agency must provide reasons 
in the rulemaking record as a means of providing some enforcement of the underenforced 
nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 
YALE L.J. 952, 996–1000 (2009). This Article does not take a position on the precise timing of 
when the agency must provide the reasons. Rather, it assumes, consistent with Chenery, that courts 
can only examine the agency’s reasons that were made in the rulemaking record.  
272. This Article does not take a position on whether adoption of this rational basis with bite 
approach would overrule Chevron. As previously mentioned, Chevron created an exception from 
the typical arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied under State Farm that applies when 
courts review agencies’ interpretation of statutes that they are delegated to administer. See supra 
notes 164–167 and accompanying text. Chevron could easily remain as an entrenched exception to 
this rational basis with bite approach that applies when courts review agency statutory 
interpretation.  
273. Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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abilities to use their policy preferences to invalidate agency rulemaking, 
and (2) rational basis with bite fits comfortably within the Supreme 
Court’s precedents on APA arbitrary and capricious review.  
This first major advantage—adopting a standard that is not too 
stringent yet not too lenient—is what motivated the Court to use rational 
basis with bite in reviewing legislation. The Court did not want judges to 
have the latitude to strike down much legislation, but it believed 
minimum rationality review was too lenient.274 Minimum rationality 
review and strict scrutiny—the two extreme standards for reviewing 
legislation—can therefore be eliminated easily as inappropriate 
standards for review of agency rulemaking. The significant differences 
between agencies and Congress, as well as the underenforced 
nondelegation doctrine,275 provide a strong basis for subjecting agency 
rulemaking to a more heightened standard than the minimum rationality 
review used for reviewing most legislation.276 In fact, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Fox Television made this observation in recognizing the 
differences between Congress and agencies and noting that agencies 
could not be given “unbridled discretion.”277 At the same time, under 
strict scrutiny, judges would be even more likely to use their policy 
preferences when reviewing agency rulemaking than they have been 
                                                     
274. See supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra Part I.B; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 (1983) (“The Department of Transportation suggests that the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear under the 
Due Process Clause. We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded 
legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its 
statutory mandate.”). 
276. This, of course, would contradict Pacific States Box, which expressly equated agency 
rulemaking with congressional legislation. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. But the 
courts are long past treating agency rulemaking the same as congressional legislation. See supra 
Parts I.B, I.C. Moreover, in the same year that Pacific States Box was decided (1935), the Court 
used the nondelegation doctrine twice to invalidate congressional delegations to agencies. A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935). Those are the only two times the Court has invoked the nondelegation 
doctrine to invalidate congressional delegations of power. It is therefore unclear whether Pacific 
State Box’s holding was premised on the view that the Court would be actively enforcing the 
nondelegation doctrine, as the nondelegation doctrine could prevent Congress from delegating large 
amounts of legislative power. Had the Pacific States Box Court known that the modern Court would 
basically not enforce the nondelegation doctrine, Pacific States Box may very well have treated 
agency rulemaking differently from legislation. 
277. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 
(2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
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under the State Farm dicta criteria. Even staunch advocates of reducing 
deference to agencies would probably not evaluate agency rulemaking 
under strict scrutiny, as that would imply that almost all agency action is 
suspect and illegitimate.278  
That, of course, leaves intermediate scrutiny as the alternative to 
rational basis with bite. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court would 
also look at the agency’s actual statutory purposes; but instead of merely 
requiring the agency’s rule to be rationally related to a legitimate 
purpose, intermediate scrutiny would require the rule to be substantially 
related to an important purpose. This more indeterminate phrasing of the 
intermediate scrutiny standard would probably allow courts to retain the 
D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine, which has resulted in unmanageable, 
politicized doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking. Tellingly, the 
Supreme Court recently stated that intermediate scrutiny for reviewing 
legislation required a “hard look.”279  
Intermediate scrutiny would give courts at least as much leeway to 
invalidate agency rulemaking as the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine. 
For example, if a statutory delegation contained more than one policy 
directive, a court reviewing under intermediate scrutiny could favor one 
policy over another—by stating that one statutory purpose was 
important while another was not—and invalidate agency action that 
relied on the less-favored policy. In fact, most delegations direct 
agencies to do some form of cost-benefit analysis, so a reviewing court 
could invalidate agency action on the grounds that the agency should 
have given other, more important statutory purposes greater weight than 
the agency gave to cost-benefit analysis.280 As another example, an 
agency could promulgate a rule that sets a standard at a certain level. 
                                                     
278. Cf. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 695 n.9 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“There is also room for especially rigorous judicial scrutiny of agency decisions under a 
rationale akin to that offered in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 
(1938).” (citing Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971))); Envtl. Def. 
Fund, 439 F.2d at 598 (“[C]ourts are increasingly asked to review administrative action that touches 
on fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have always had a 
special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the economic interests at stake in a 
ratemaking or licensing proceeding.”). 
279. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996). 
280. But see John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 395, 403 (2008) (“My central argument is that [cost-benefit analysis], while easy to 
criticize because of its transparency, has compelling philosophical and practical advantages over 
other suggested approaches to lifesaving regulation.” (citation omitted)). 
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Under intermediate scrutiny, a court could then find that the standard is 
not stringent enough to qualify as substantially related to the important 
statutory purpose relied upon.  
It would be much harder to invalidate agency action under rational 
basis with bite than under intermediate scrutiny. That is not to say that 
rational basis with bite leaves no room for judges to invalidate agency 
action: an agency’s rule must be rationally related to a legitimate 
statutory purpose actually invoked by the agency. Judges could therefore 
find the agency’s rule was not rationally related or the purpose was not 
legitimate. The labels “rationally related” and “legitimate” are not rock-
solid limitations that completely cabin the discretion of judges. 
However, rational basis with bite does make it more difficult to 
invalidate agency action. Any purpose contained in a statutory 
delegation will be a legitimate governmental purpose. As long as the 
agency invokes a purpose enumerated by the statute, courts will not be 
able to invalidate agency action under the purpose prong of rational 
basis with bite. And the rationally related prong implies a standard of 
objective reasonableness, where a judge asks whether an objectively 
reasonable person would be compelled to conclude that the agency rule 
was not related to the statutory purpose.281 Judges can manipulate review 
under an objective reasonableness standard, but it is much more difficult 
to get away with erroneously calling a rule “irrational” than with 
deciding that the agency’s purpose is not “important” or the rule is not 
“substantially” related to that purpose.  
The rational basis with bite standard is therefore important if for no 
other reason than it can highlight when courts are egregiously 
overstepping their mandate of conducting arbitrary and capricious 
review without being swayed by judicial policy preferences. One of the 
reasons the Supreme Court rarely addresses arbitrary and capricious 
review is that, because there is no metric for determining when a judge 
decides a case based on policy preferences, such cases are largely 
insulated from review.282 The rational basis with bite doctrine will 
                                                     
281. Cf. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992). 
282. See Scalia, supra note 34, at 372 (stating that agency rulemaking is largely insulated from 
Supreme Court review because courts frequently offer “dicta, alternate holdings, and confused 
holdings”); see also Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1131 (1987) (“As long as the practice of hard-look review continues to be accepted, an 
uncorrected lower court error of this dimension, however costly to the particular enterprise being 
challenged, presents less of a claim on the Court’s limited resources.”). 
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illuminate when courts of appeals let policy preferences dictate their 
results, as it will require judges to employ an objective reasonableness 
standard—and the Supreme Court is quite comfortable reviewing under 
objective reasonableness standards.283  
Moreover, the perceived stringency of the standard for reviewing 
agency rulemaking affects whether agencies, ex ante, will choose to 
engage in rulemaking in the first place. Before studies in the past decade 
found that judges were infusing their policy preferences into arbitrary 
and capricious review,284 the most cited argument against State Farm 
was that it ossified rulemaking:285 Agencies would not engage in new 
rulemaking and existing rules would never be changed because agencies 
feared that the resources they would devote to the rulemaking would be 
wasted if a court invalidated the rule.286 If all agency rulemaking were to 
                                                     
283. For example, the Supreme Court frequently uses an objective reasonableness standard in 
reviewing state court judgments in Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) habeas 
cases and Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases. See, e.g., Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. 
Ct. 823, 831 (2009) (AEDPA habeas review); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (Fourth 
Amendment). 
284. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
285. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225 
(1990) (“The result of judicial requirements for comprehensive rationality has been a general 
suppression of the use of rules.”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992) (explaining that “many observers from across 
the political spectrum” saw the “ossification” of the rulemaking process as “one of the most serious 
problems . . . facing regulatory agencies”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 66 (1995) (“Judicial ossification of rulemaking is a function of 
two variables: (1) judicial imposition of decisionmaking procedures that are costly and time-
consuming; and, (2) the high risk of judicial invalidation of a rule on either procedural or 
substantive grounds.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 453, 457 (1995) (“Pierce correctly identifies the social costs of rulemaking 
ossification . . . .”). But see William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through 
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 444–45 (2000) (“Judicial review under the hard 
look doctrine is the price we pay for delegating highly complex important public policy decisions to 
unelected administrative agencies. The ossification critique has long suggested that the price is too  
high . . . . This research suggests otherwise.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: 
Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 483, 523 (1997) (“Critics of hard look review are on solid ground in concluding that 
aggressive judicial review of agency reasoning has contributed to ossification of the rulemaking 
process. Their assertion, however, that merely easing the standard of review will deossify this 
process is more tenuous.”). 
286. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) 
(remarking that State Farm has “gradually transformed rulemaking—whether regulatory or 
deregulatory rulemaking—from the simple and speedy practice contemplated by the APA into a 
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be viewed like a suspect classification that triggers intermediate 
scrutiny,287 agency rulemaking would probably become even more 
ossified as agencies would not even be able to argue that arbitrary and 
capricious review is “narrow.”288 Yet the primary reason Congress 
delegates authority to agencies is to increase government efficiency and 
adaptability.289 Plus, if agencies cannot plausibly engage in informal 
rulemaking, this will result in the unintended consequence of forcing 
agencies to use even less formal (and less transparent) methods of 
regulation. In fact, the recent spike in Chevron Step Zero cases 
addressing these less formal methods is probably a direct result of the 
ossification of informal rulemaking.290 This ossification would continue 
under intermediate scrutiny review of agency rulemaking because that 
standard implies that courts could quite plausibly strike down a 
significant amount of agency rulemaking. In contrast, rational basis with 
bite would uphold most rules. 
The second major advantage of adopting the rational basis with bite 
approach for reviewing agency rulemaking is that it accommodates the 
Supreme Court’s APA arbitrary and capricious review precedents 
amazingly well.291 Only in the past few decades have courts and 
commentators recognized that rational basis with bite was a different 
form of rational basis review than minimum rationality review.292 But 
before anyone had a label for rational basis with bite, Chenery implicitly 
implemented this doctrine in reviewing agency action—just one year 
after the APA was enacted.293 Chenery held that a court had to review 
the actual purposes “invoked by the agency” instead of “substituting 
what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.”294 And the 
                                                     
laborious, seemingly never-ending process”). 
287. See supra notes 225–228 and accompanying text. 
288. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
289. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
290. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
291. Justice O’Connor explained that rational basis with bite doctrine for reviewing legislation is 
a “searching” form of judicial review, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment), which parallels Overton Park’s observation that APA arbitrary and 
capricious review is “searching,” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.  
292. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
294. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (Chenery II); see also Massachusetts v. 
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requirement that courts examine the actual purposes instead of 
hypothetical purposes is precisely what makes rational basis with bite a 
heightened standard compared to minimum rationality review.295  
Fox Television explicitly recognized both prongs of the rational basis 
with bite standard. As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence confirmed, it is the 
“duty of agencies” to provide an explanation that justifies their rules, as 
opposed to allowing courts to come up with hypothetical explanations.296 
And Justice Scalia’s majority opinion clarified that courts should review 
agency rulemaking to determine whether the agency’s rule was 
“rational.”297 
Furthermore, even Overton Park and most of State Farm can easily 
be reconciled with the rational basis with bite approach. The agency in 
Overton Park gave no explanation of how the statutory predicates at 
issue were met, so the agency had not even tried to invoke a legitimate 
statutory purpose.298 Similarly, the agency in State Farm did not give 
any explanation for why it was rescinding the requirement that new cars 
have airbags or nondetachable automatic seatbelts—alternatives required 
under then-existing regulations.299 The agency therefore did not even 
attempt to invoke the legitimate statutory purpose of increasing car 
safety while accounting for the costs of implementing car safety 
features. 
Beyond these watershed precedents, other recent Supreme Court 
cases also support applying the rational basis with bite approach when 
reviewing agency rulemaking. A number of cases before Fox Television 
signaled that the Court wanted to retreat from the State Farm dicta 
conception of a stringent standard for arbitrary and capricious review. 
United States Postal Service v. Gregory described arbitrary and 
                                                     
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (“If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA 
from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, 
EPA must say so.”); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (“The explanation may have been 
curt, but it surely indicated the determinative reason for the final action taken . . . .” (citing SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I)). 
295. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
296. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 
(2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
297. Id. at 1812 (majority opinion). 
298. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408 (1971). See supra notes 77–
79 and accompanying text. 
299. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 38–39 (1983). 
See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text. 
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capricious review as “extremely narrow.”300 And seven Justices in 
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC limited State Farm’s “more 
searching judicial review” to cases that “involved review of an agency’s 
‘changing its course.’”301 Even Justice Breyer, the one Justice who did 
not sign on to the majority opinion,302 described arbitrary and capricious 
review as a form of “‘rational basis’ review.”303  
These signals supporting the use of rational basis with bite in arbitrary 
and capricious review cases align with the Court’s more general trend of 
interpreting the APA as it was understood when Congress enacted it in 
1946.304 In 1946, the arbitrary and capricious standard was the 
equivalent of the rational basis standard used for reviewing 
legislation.305 However, at that time, it was unclear whether the rational 
basis standard was the minimum rationality approach that allowed courts 
to examine any conceivable purpose that Congress may have had, or the 
rational basis with bite approach that limited courts to looking at only 
the actual purpose stated by Congress.306 The rational basis with bite 
approach to reviewing agency rulemaking may therefore be perfectly in 
line with what Congress understood arbitrary and capricious review to 
mean in 1946. At the very least, Congress in 1946 did not think of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard as a level of review (such as 
intermediate scrutiny) that was reserved for suspect classifications.  
While all of these precedents support the rational basis with bite 
approach for reviewing agency rulemaking, there is only one Supreme 
Court precedent—rather, one-third of a precedent—that could support 
the case for intermediate scrutiny: State Farm’s 5–4 holding that the 
agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously by rejecting the detachable 
automatic seatbelt regulation. The debate over detachable automatic 
seatbelts boiled down to how much these seatbelts would increase 
seatbelt usage, which affected the cost-benefit analysis permitted by the 
agency’s statutory delegation.307 Recall that the majority, in an opinion 
                                                     
300. 534 U.S. 1, 7 (2001) (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416). Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 
(arbitrary and capricious review is “narrow”); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (same). 
301. 535 U.S. 467, 502 n.20 (2002). 
302. Justice O’Connor was recused. Id. at 474. 
303. Id. at 562 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
304. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes 42–51 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
307. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983) 
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by Justice White, determined that the agency invalidly rescinded the 
detachable automatic seatbelt regulation because the agency did not 
consider the “inertia” favoring seatbelt use based on the fact that “the 
passive belt, once reattached, [would] continue to function automatically 
unless again disconnected.”308 Justice Rehnquist disagreed in his dissent, 
stating that the “agency acknowledged that there would probably be 
some increase in belt usage, but concluded that the increase would be 
small and not worth the cost of mandatory detachable automatic 
belts.”309  
The rational basis with bite approach to reviewing agency rulemaking 
supports Justice Rehnquist’s position. Cost-benefit analysis was a 
legitimate statutory purpose,310 which the agency invoked to justify its 
rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation311—thereby satisfying its 
obligation under rational basis with bite and Chenery to explain its 
actual purpose.312 The remaining question was whether the agency had 
explained how its rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation was 
rationally related to the cost-benefit analysis performed by the agency.313 
As Justice Rehnquist’s dissent noted, the agency provided a “rational 
connection” between the two314 by explaining that detachable seatbelts 
required an affirmative act to use once detached and it was likely that 
many people would detach their seatbelt at some point as many people 
were not using manual seatbelts.315 That observation is at the very least 
reasonable; even if a court could think otherwise, one could see how a 
                                                     
(stating that the statutory delegation directed the agency to “issue motor vehicle safety standards 
that ‘shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in 
objective terms’” (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a))); see also id. (directing the 
agency to consider “whether the proposed standard ‘is reasonable, practicable and appropriate” 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1))). 
308. Id. at 54. 
309. Id. at 58–59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
310. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
311. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 38–39 (positing that the agency concluded that it could no 
longer find that detachable seatbelts “would produce significant safety benefits,” so the detachable 
seatbelt regulation was “no longer . . . reasonable or practicable in the agency’s view” given the “$1 
billion” it would cost to implement the regulation). 
312. See supra notes 69, 238 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
314. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 146, 168 (1962)). 
315. See id. at 54 (majority opinion) (“A detached passive belt does require an affirmative act to 
reconnect it . . . .”). 
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reasonable agency could look at the human behavior associated with 
seatbelts and conclude that people not inclined to use manual seatbelts 
would be inclined to detach automatic seatbelts at least once and then 
never reattach them.  
Justice White’s majority opinion, though, was more in line with an 
intermediate scrutiny-type standard that requires the agency rule to be 
substantially related to an important statutory purpose.316 First, the State 
Farm majority wanted the agency to provide a more direct explanation 
of how the rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation was related to 
the agency’s cost-benefit analysis. The five-Justice majority did not 
evaluate whether the agency’s explanation was reasonable. Instead, it 
second-guessed the expert agency’s conclusion on an empirical matter 
by raising the “inertia” point.317 To be sure, Justice White’s argument on 
inertia is a plausible view of how people would use detachable automatic 
seatbelts, and it may even have been more plausible than the agency’s. 
But the agency’s view was within the realm of reason. Consequently, the 
State Farm majority implicitly required the agency to explain how its 
rule was substantially related—as opposed to merely rationally related—
to its cost-benefit analysis. Second, Justice White stated in dicta that car 
safety was a more important statutory purpose than cost-benefit 
analysis.318 Thus, even if the agency had accounted for Justice White’s 
inertia argument, the State Farm majority may still have invalidated the 
rescission of the detachable seatbelt regulation by prioritizing the 
statutory purpose of car safety over the statutory purpose of requiring 
regulations to be practicable. This, of course, is precisely how courts 
could use intermediate scrutiny to strike down large amounts of agency 
action.319 
This narrow debate in State Farm should not prevent courts from 
adopting the rational basis with bite approach for reviewing agency 
rulemaking. Most importantly, Fox Television implicitly limited State 
Farm,320 and it did not apply the “failed to consider an important aspect” 
criterion for invalidating agency action321 that was used in State Farm to 
                                                     
316. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
318. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 55 (“In reaching its judgment, NHTSA should bear in mind that 
Congress intended safety to be the pre-eminent factor under the [Motor Vehicle Safety] Act . . . .”). 
319. See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra notes 180–184 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.  
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invalidate the rescission of the detachable automatic seatbelt 
regulation.322 Indeed, Fox Television confirmed that courts should only 
ask whether the agency’s rule was “rational”323—a holding that may 
very well contradict and overrule the approach the State Farm majority 
opinion used to invalidate the detachable automatic seatbelt 
alternatives.324 Plus, State Farm itself was never focused on the contours 
of a heightened standard of review for agency rulemaking. The briefing 
and argument in State Farm was focused on other issues325—namely, on 
whether rescission of a rule was to be reviewed as if the agency had not 
acted in the first instance.326 And State Farm split 5–4 on the detachable 
automatic seatbelt issue, so the precedential value of this holding is 
significantly limited.327  
On the other hand, an argument against the rational basis with bite 
approach to reviewing agency rulemaking is that this standard is still too 
indeterminate and manipulable to prevent judges from politicizing 
administrative law.328 Admittedly, rational basis with bite includes 
standards that could allow judges to base their judgments on their policy 
preferences by equivocating on the term “rational” as the D.C. Circuit 
has done.329 Further, various scholars have noted how the three main 
tiers of scrutiny (minimum rationality, intermediate scrutiny, and strict 
scrutiny) are not applied consistently even in reviewing legislation—
although that is largely due to the Court’s refusal to formally recognize 
the rational basis with bite standard.330  
                                                     
322. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
323. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812 
(2009). 
324. See supra notes 316–319 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
326. See Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1810 (“[State Farm], which involved the rescission of a 
prior regulation, said only that such action requires ‘a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that 
which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.’” (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983))). 
327. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828–29 (1991) (overruling precedents that 
“were decided by the narrowest of margins”). 
328. See Cross, supra note 13, at 1327 (“Numerous judges and scholars have sought over the 
years to constrain the scope of judicial review or to improve its functioning through a variety of 
legal standards. Such proposals, however, merely shuffle the buzz words required of an 
interventionist court.”). 
329. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
330. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 485–90 
(2004); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of 
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Beyond doctrinal implications, some would object that the rational 
basis with bite standard would not give courts adequate latitude to cabin 
the discretion of agencies. In other words, rational basis with bite might 
uphold too many rules. It is true that rational basis with bite would 
uphold a significant amount of agency rules, assuming the agency 
provides a short, yet rational explanation to justify the rule. This 
concern, though, has to be balanced with the empirical evidence 
confirming that when judges are given significant discretion to 
invalidate agency action, their policy preferences affect their 
decisions.331 Moreover, Congress made the determination in the APA 
that judicial review of agency rulemaking should be quite deferential. If 
Congress now believes that courts should have more authority to 
invalidate agency rulemaking, it can easily amend the APA to provide 
for a different standard of judicial review.  
Rational basis with bite may not be a perfect standard, but it is still 
the best doctrine available for reviewing agency rulemaking under the 
APA. The only way to eliminate any chance of judges using their policy 
preferences to uphold or invalidate agency rulemaking is to get rid of all 
judicial review of agency rulemaking.332 But making agency rulemaking 
unreviewable would conflict with Congress’s codification of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard in the APA and all of the Supreme 
Court’s precedents on reviewing agency action.333 In fact, it would 
subject congressional legislation to standards of review more heightened 
than those for agency rulemaking, which is completely backwards.334 So 
unless Congress repeals the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review altogether, judicial review of agency rulemaking is not going 
anywhere. Rational basis with bite is therefore the best approach for 
limiting the use of policy preferences by judges when they review 
agency rulemaking, while still subjecting agency rulemaking to a 
heightened standard of review compared to legislation.  
                                                     
Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 173–77 (1984). 
331. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
332. See Cross, supra note 13, at 1328–29 (“An effort to cobble together a deferential system of 
judicial review of rulemaking is a fool’s errand. Only clear firebreaks that preclude such review and 
that render disobedience obvious can be effective.”). 
333. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 
1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Congress confined 
agencies’ discretion and subjected their decisions to judicial review.”). 
334. See supra Part I.B. 
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B. Applying Rational Basis with Bite to Recent Court of Appeals 
Cases Reviewing Agency Rulemaking  
As discussed previously, Fox Television essentially applied the 
rational basis with bite standard,335 and the rational basis with bite 
standard would have produced a different result in State Farm.336 
Besides those examples of how the rational basis with bite standard 
would function in reviewing agency rulemaking, this section briefly 
applies rational basis with bite to two recent court of appeals cases as 
additional examples of how courts could apply this standard in a 
manageable way. As documented in the past, “[b]etween one-third and 
sixty percent of agency rules that [were] appealed to courts [were] 
overturned through application of the hard-look doctrine.”337 The 
rational basis with bite doctrine would drastically reduce that figure, 
thereby cabining the discretion of judges to use their policy preferences 
to invalidate agency rulemaking. For example, in both American Radio 
Relay League, Inc. v. FCC338 and Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to 
Pesticides (NCAP) v. EPA,339 the majorities invalidated agency rules, but 
the rational basis with bite standard would have supported the dissenters’ 
arguments for upholding the rules.  
The D.C. Circuit in American Radio invalidated an FCC rule that 
reestablished a preexisting extrapolation factor for estimating 
interference caused by regulated technologies including “Broadband 
over Power Line” (BPL), which allows internet access simply by 
plugging a computer into an electrical outlet.340 That extrapolation factor 
determined whether an operator of any communications apparatus could 
                                                     
335. See supra notes 296–297 and accompanying text. 
336. See supra notes 310–315 and accompanying text. 
337. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to Beermann 
and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 907 n.35 (2007) (citing Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald 
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Analysis of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 984, 1021–22 (1991); Patricia M. Wald, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, Keynote Address at the ABA Section of Administrative Law Fall Meeting: The 
Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law (Oct. 1987), in 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 528 
(1988)). 
338. 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
339. 544 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2008). 
340. Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 240–41; see id. at 240 (“The ‘distance extrapolation factor[ ]’ is the 
projected rate at which radio frequency strength decreases from a radiation-emitting source, used to 
estimate signal decay for Access BPL and resulting interference to radio operators at various 
distances from a source without actually measuring such emissions.”). 
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get a license to use a regulated technology like BPL, because the FCC 
would not issue a license if the technology would cause too much 
interference with radio operators.341 A federal agency within the 
Department of Commerce provided data supporting the preexisting 
extrapolation factor, and one commenter during the rulemaking process 
determined that the characteristics of BPL interference also favored 
keeping the preexisting extrapolation factor.342 Two other commenters, 
though, recommended a lower extrapolation factor.343 The agency 
explicitly recognized these different views and decided to retain the 
preexisting extrapolation factor given a “lack of conclusive experimental 
data.”344 The agency then reconsidered this decision after one 
commenter submitted new studies, which supported the use of a lower 
extrapolation factor.345 The agency noted these various conflicting views 
and stated that they were accounted for in its initial decision; it 
concluded that “[n]o new information has been submitted that would 
provide a convincing argument for modifying [the preexisting 
extrapolation factor] at this time.”346  
Citing State Farm, the majority in American Radio held that this was 
not a “reasoned explanation” for rejecting the new studies, which 
supported the use of a lower extrapolation factor.347 The majority also 
noted that the agency’s modeling data was “not based on empirical 
evidence derived from testing or scientific observation.”348  
Judge Kavanaugh dissented, explaining that the agency “reasonably 
stated that the evidence submitted by commenters was conflicting [and] 
that the new evidence submitted on reconsideration was not sufficiently 
                                                     
341. Id. at 232. 
342. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement 
Guidelines for Access Broadband Over Power Line Systems, 19 F.C.C.R. 21265, 21310 ¶ 109 
(2004), cited in Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 247 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
343. Id. 
344. Id. 
345. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement 
Guidelines for Access Broadband Over Power Line Systems, 21 F.C.C.R. 9308, 9317–18 ¶ 26 
(2006), cited in Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 241. 
346. Id. at 9318. 
347. Am. Radio, 524 F.3d at 241 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983)). 
348. Id. at 240. 
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conclusive to require a change.”349 He also posited that a short 
explanation can still be reasoned, as “State Farm does not require a word 
count.”350 
The rational basis with bite standard supports Judge Kavanaugh’s 
dissent in American Radio. No one disputed that the agency was acting 
in furtherance of its statutory purpose of setting radio interference 
standards that are “consistent with the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.”351 The question therefore would be whether the agency 
explained how its decision to keep the preexisting extrapolation factor 
was rationally related to that purpose. Admittedly, the agency’s 
explanation in its reconsideration order hardly addressed the new 
studies, but rational basis with bite would not require the agency to 
explain every study presented to the agency. Even under State Farm, the 
agency is required simply to articulate a “rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made,”352 and the Court will “‘uphold a 
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may be reasonably 
discerned.’”353 Here, the agency’s reasoning was clear: The agency had 
already been presented with conflicting studies, the new studies simply 
added to this scientific split, and the agency cautiously decided to retain 
its long-standing approach given the disputed scientific evidence.  
The American Radio majority employed the quasi-procedural hard 
look doctrine and erred by using a divide-and-conquer approach that 
required the agency to offer a detailed explanation for rejecting each 
adverse study.354 Yet the Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric 
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. had clarified that 
reviewing courts should be “most deferential” when an agency is 
“making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers 
of science.”355 And had the agency changed its position by adopting the 
                                                     
349. Id. at 248 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
350. Id. 
351. Id. at 231 (majority opinion) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a) (2006)). 
352. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 
156, 168 (1962)). 
353. Id. at 43 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 
286 (1974)). 
354. Cf., e.g., Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fernandez, J., dissenting) 
(noting that by isolating each piece of evidence through a “divide-and-conquer strategy,” a 
reviewing court “can make it seem like [it is] deferring when [it is] not actually doing so”). 
355. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
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lower extrapolation factor, courts could have criticized the agency under 
State Farm because the agency changed its long-standing extrapolation 
factor on the basis of disputed evidence. If it is unreasonable for the 
agency to explain that it was presented with conflicting studies and 
chose to retain its preexisting standard, the agency simply cannot win 
and courts will always be able to invalidate agency rulemaking involving 
disputed scientific issues. The rational basis with bite approach would 
prevent this by requiring only that the agency explain how its rule is 
rationally related to a statutory purpose under the agency’s statutory 
delegation.  
Like American Radio, the Ninth Circuit in Northwest Coalition for 
Alternatives to Pesticides (NCAP) v. EPA356 invalidated agency rules357 
under State Farm because the agency had not “demonstrate[d] a rational 
connection between the factors that the EPA examined and the 
conclusions it reached.”358 Under the Food Quality Protection Act 
(FQPA), the agency was required to apply a 10x child safety factor (i.e., 
assume that pesticides were ten times more likely to be toxic to infants 
and children), unless the agency had “reliable data” to use a different 
child safety factor.359 The agency promulgated regulations that set a 3x 
child safety factor for acetamiprid and pymetrozine and a 1x child safety 
factor for mepiquat.360  
The rulemaking record contained multiple documents pertaining to 
the original promulgation of these safety factors in 2001 and 2002. The 
agency explained that the “toxicology database” for acetamiprid was 
complete and a study of the pesticide in animals showed no evidence of 
“increased susceptibility,” but the results of a developmental 
neurotoxicity study were still pending.361 Likewise, there was a 
“complete toxicity database for pymetrozine” and a study in animals 
showed “no evidence of increased susceptibility,” but the “FQPA safety 
factor was not reduced to one due to the need for a developmental 
                                                     
356. 544 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2008). 
357. Id. at 1048. 
358. Id. at 1052 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983)). 
359. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (2006). 
360. NCAP, 544 F.3d at 1047. 
361. Id. at 1054 n.3 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Acetamiprid: 
Pesticide Tolerance, 67 Fed. Reg. 14,649, 14,655 (Mar. 27, 2002)). 
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neurotoxicity study.”362 As for mepiquat, other studies had already 
determined that the “risk estimates” for a compound nearly identical to 
mepiquat “were below the Agency’s level of concern.”363 The 
rulemaking record also included the agency’s published guidance 
document for determining FQPA safety factors; this document provided 
that the agency could reduce the safety factor to 3x if it had evidence 
that the pesticide was not more dangerous to children, but the results of a 
key study were missing, which thus created “database deficiencies.”364 
The record indicated that this 3x uncertainty factor was generally 
accepted by the scientific community.365  
Additionally, the record included the agency’s 2005 final order 
establishing the regulations, which rejected the objections made by 
interested parties to the agency’s decision to reduce the child safety 
factors for these three pesticides.366 This final order cited the agency’s 
explanation in originally promulgating these safety factors, and it again 
noted that the results of the developmental neurotoxicity studies were 
pending.367 
The NCAP majority invalidated these three pesticide regulations on 
the grounds that the 2005 final order was “vague, making it 
impossible . . . to determine whether the EPA’s deviations from the 10x 
child safety factor . . . were in fact supported by reliable data.”368 Citing 
State Farm, the majority stated that “it is entirely unclear why the EPA 
chose safety factors of 3x . . . and 1x . . . as opposed to 4x or 5x or 8x or 
9x.”369  
Judge Ikuta dissented, finding that the agency’s regulations were not 
arbitrary because the rulemaking record included much more of an 
explanation than simply the agency’s 2005 final order responding to 
                                                     
362. Id. (quoting Pymetrozine: Pesticide Tolerance, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,786, 66,791 (Dec. 27, 
2001)). 
363. Id. (quoting Mepiquat: Pesticide Tolerance, 67 Fed. Reg. 3113, 3115 (Jan. 23, 2002)). 
364. Id. at 1059 (quoting Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA, Determinations of the Appropriate 
FQPA Safety Factor(s) in Tolerance Assessment 10 (Feb. 28, 2002)). 
365. Id. at 1059 (citing Michael L. Dourson et al., Evolution of Science-Based Uncertainty 
Factors in Noncancer Risk Assessment, 24 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 108 (1996)). 
366. Id. at 1047 (majority opinion) (citing Order Denying Objections to Issuances of Tolerances, 
70 Fed. Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 10, 2005)). 
367. Id. at 1051–52. 
368. Id. at 1051. 
369. Id. at 1052 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983)). 
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objections.370 She quoted the agency’s explanations from 2001 and 2002 
when it originally promulgated these regulations,371 and she referred to 
the documents supporting the use of a 3x safety factor when the results 
of a key study were pending.372 Given “the EPA’s reliance on [the] long-
established and widely accepted protocol” of using a 3x safety factor if 
the results of one key study were pending, Judge Ikuta reasoned that the 
court should have “defer[red] to the scientific analysis and judgments 
made by an agency operating within its area of special expertise.”373 
The rational basis with bite standard supports Judge Ikuta’s dissent. 
Like American Radio, no one questioned that the agency was acting in 
furtherance of its statutory purpose of maintaining child safety.374 So the 
dispositive question under rational basis with bite would be whether the 
agency explained, in the rulemaking record, how its decision to set lower 
child safety standards was rationally related to the purpose of ensuring 
child safety. Taken in isolation, the 2005 final order itself may not have 
provided such an explanation, but the 2005 final order cited the 
explanations given by the agency in 2001 and 2002 when it originally 
promulgated these regulations.  
In addition, the rest of the rulemaking record easily explains how the 
lower child safety factors are rationally related to the agency’s statutory 
mandate of lowering the child safety factor below 10x only when it had 
“reliable data.” The record stated that the databases of studies for 
acetamiprid and pymetrozine were complete except for the 
developmental neurotoxicity studies, and that studies in animals did not 
show an increased risk.375 The record also stated that the agency chose a 
3x factor for these two pesticides given the accepted practice of the 
scientific community for situations where the results of just one key 
study are pending.376 Finally, the record indicated that studies already 
showed no increased risk in children from exposure to a substance 
nearly identical to mepiquat. The agency thus had reliable data to reduce 
that pesticide’s child safety factor to 1x because there was no database 
                                                     
370. Id. at 1053–56, 1058–60 (Ikuta, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
371. Id. at 1054 n.3. 
372. Id. at 1059. 
373. Id. at 1059–60 (citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 462 
U.S. 87, 103 (1983)). 
374. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (2006). 
375. See supra notes 361–362 and accompanying text. 
376. See supra notes 364–365 and accompanying text. 
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deficiency for mepiquat.377 In sum, by examining only the 2005 final 
order instead of the entire rulemaking record, the majority invoked State 
Farm and ignored the agency’s explanation in other portions of the 
record. Those other portions of the record, though, showed a rational 
relation between the child safety factor rules and the statutory purpose of 
ensuring child safety. 
Both American Radio and NCAP show that the rational basis with bite 
standard would limit the ability of judges to use their policy preferences 
to invalidate agency rulemaking. This approach would also make it 
easier to see when judges invalidate agency rules even when the agency 
has provided a perfectly reasonable explanation to support its decision. 
At the same time, rational basis with bite would establish a uniform two-
step inquiry, which would constrain the ability of judges to nitpick 
agency records to find some ambiguity that can be squeezed into one of 
the State Farm criteria for invalidating agency rules.  
CONCLUSION 
Unelected judges have become some of our nation’s most powerful 
policy wonks. This past year, judges invalidated Bush Administration 
regulations on high-profile issues like global warming and the broadcast 
of indecent material.378 In the coming years, judges could just as easily 
invalidate Obama Administration regulations on issues like stem cell 
research, oil drilling, air and water quality standards, or fuel emission 
regulations.379  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. might prevent judges from continuing to use their policy 
preferences to invalidate agency rules. But to ensure that judges’ policy 
preferences are not ossifying agency rules, courts need to craft a doctrine 
for reviewing agency rulemaking that goes beyond setting fact-specific 
examples of how courts should conduct APA arbitrary and capricious 
review. This doctrine also needs to give appropriate deference to expert 
agencies that are charged with setting our nation’s policies. It should 
have a theoretical limitation grounded in the precedents for reviewing 
legislation, which have been developed over the past century.  
                                                     
377. See supra note 363 and accompanying text. 
378. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
379. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
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This Article proposes the rational basis with bite doctrine because it is 
a heightened standard of review that accounts for the differences 
between agencies and legislatures. Moreover, rational basis with bite 
would effectively prevent judges from using their policy preferences to 
invalidate agency rules, and it fits most closely with Supreme Court 
precedent on APA arbitrary and capricious review.  
Our modern administrative state, which does not fall neatly within 
any one of our three branches of government, is still largely a work in 
progress.380 Indeed, the fact that twenty-six years passed before the 
Supreme Court in Fox Television addressed State Farm’s approach to 
APA arbitrary and capricious review is an implicit recognition that 
agencies and lower courts needed latitude to experiment with the proper 
ways to review agency rulemaking. But as Fox Television confirms, that 
experiment has failed. Judges have been pulled into policy debates in 
ways that the framers of our Constitution could never have 
contemplated.  
Fox Television was correct to scrap the paternalistic doctrines that 
allow judges to invalidate agency rulemaking by disagreeing with the 
substantive policy decisions made by administrative agencies. Getting 
rid of State Farm’s dicta and the D.C. Circuit’s hard look doctrine will 
allow presidential administrations to respond to the electorate, resulting 
in a structure of government more in line with constitutional separation 
of powers principles. This, in turn, may end the regulatory battles that 
have been waged between presidential administrations of one political 
party and judges appointed by the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
380. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. __ (Apr. 28, 2009), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 
1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The dynamics of 
the three branches of Government are well understood as a general matter. But the role and position 
of the agency, and the exact locus of its power, present questions that are delicate, subtle, and 
complex.”); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The rise of 
administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century . . . . 
They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-
branch legal theories . . . .”). 
